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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE 
by 
Charalambos Demetriou 
The plans for Economic and Monetary Union in Europe became difficult to 
achieve during the period 1992-1993. The convergence criteria set up in the 
Maastricht Treaty block the road towards unification. It is very complex to expect 
twelve governments with different shades of political colour and twelve states with 
different economic interests to compromise in such criteria (as inflation, government 
borrowing, exchange rate stability and interest rates) and eventually, speak with one 
voice at the end of this decade. 
This current research provides significant modifications in The Maastricht 
Treaty , policy making, objectives, even changes in political behavior for better 
coordination to tackle any turbulence that stands on the way. These changes were 
unveiled and supported by outside views. The right time for transition to the monetary 
union depends on the rate of progress in Europe in meeting the stability requirements 
and in the willingness to move to a more developed political union. Monetary Union 
could occur late in 1990s but with a number of members left out with major dominant 
the Germany than the EMS. 
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The European Monetary System (EMS) came into operation March 13, 1979 with the 
objective of creating a "zone of monetary stability in Europe," comprising "greater 
stability at home and abroad." However, The EMS was also seen as a clear step 
toward economic and monetary union through achieving economic convergence as 
well as monetary control. European leaders announced in late 1991 that they had 
agreed to move forward to monetary union by the end of the decade (The Maastricht 
Treaty, December 1991). Now, more than two years later, plans for the unification 
has crumbled: the Italian lira and the British pound were forced out of The EMS 
exchange rate bands in September 1992, and in 1993. The bands of most of the 
remaining members were widened dramatically, leaving The EMS a shadow of its 
former self. 
This paper reviews the plans for European Monetary Union and explores the 
problems and difficulties (as well as those in the foreign exchange markets) that have 
thrown those plans into disruption. In some countries there is evidence that 
devaluations were almost inevitable, given the policies of their governments. The 
fundamental source appears to have been the fallout from German unification. As 
background, the discussion first sketches the history and development of The EMS 
from World War II to its founding in 1979 and continues until the agreement in The 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991. European vision has always been to structure a Central 
1 
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Banking System (EuroFed) similar to the one of The United States' (USFed) that 
would formulate monetary policy for the twelve EC countries and eventually issue a 
single currency. 
In short, the purpose of this research is to examine the prospects of 
accomplishing a function of such an independent system (monetary union). Although 
some economists see EMU as an unfeasible event, we support that such a union could 
occur by the end of this decade, but with a number of states left out. 
CHAPTER 2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 
The Monetary History of Europe begins during the early post second world war period 
which is a natural starting point for any description of the long-run developments in 
European Monetary Integration. That period saw both the lowest point in terms of 
monetary integration and the beginning of the overall integration process that led later 
to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Monetary 
System (EMS), and finally to the present plans for an Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). 
The first step in this direction was the creation in 1948 of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) renamed in 1960, with an expanded 
membership, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
OEEC was mainly a response to the US call for a cooperative European effort to make 
effective use of the US and to be provided under the Marshall Plan. Although trade 
liberalization was necessary for the resumptions of significant inter-European trade was 
not in itself sufficient for as long as payments remained severely constrained. 
Bilateralism therefore, persisted even after the creation of the OEEC in 1948 and 
the exhaustion of the bilateral credit lines granted in 1946 and 1967 led to a complete 
jam in the intra-European payment system. Finally, after two years of long road, the 
European Payments Union (EPU)' was negotiated in all necessary detail in September 
'The history of the EPU negotiations and its operation is 
recorded in great detail in Kaplan and Schleigninger (1989). 
3 
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1950 with retroactive implementation July 1, 1950. The EPU covered an area that 
accounted for about seventy percent of world trade. The EPU provided an escape from 
bilateralists because each month all bilateral deficits and surpluses were netted out into 
one overall net position vis-a-vis the union2. The EPU was finally dissolved by a 
unanimous agreement at the end of 1958 and the participating countries made their 
currencies convertible. In a formal sense, the EPU was replaced by the European 
Monetary Agreement (EMA), negotiated as a successor arrangement already by 1955. 
The EMA was authorized to offer financial safety nets to participants, but it was clear 
that authority for suggesting policy adjustments and setting the terms for conditional 
lending would pass to the IMF Executive Board. 
In retrospect, the dissolution of the EPU was a loss to European Monetary 
integration. The EPU Managing Board had achieved authority by its effective 
implementation of multilateral surveillance; though the weakening of the constraints 
on debtors in the course of its eight years of existence would in any case have 
diminished that authority, there were, as noted by Triffin (1966) arguments in favor 
of keeping EPU in preference to moving unilaterally, though simultaneously, to global 
convertibility. 
2.1 The Bretton Woods System in the 1960 
Only after the reestablishment of convertibility in 1958-59 did the Bretton Woods 
agreements become really operational. The core of the agreements establishing the 
IMF consisted of the system of fixed exchange rates which linked all currencies to the 
2The success of the EPU was based on the compromise for the 
settlement of EPU balances that was finally obtained. This 
compromise was close to the ideas developed by Robert Triffin, 
see Triffin (1957) and (1966). 
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US dollar and the US dollar to gold. The IMF rates allowed for a one percent band 
of fluctuation around the central parities against the US dollar. This implied that any 
two European currencies could move by as much as six percent against each other if 
they switched their relative position against the US dollar. Since this was considered 
excessive, the European countries agreed to limit their fluctuations vis-a-vis the dollar 
to .75 percent, thus reducing the potential margin for intra-European exchange-rate 
fluctuations to three percent. 
The Signing of the Treaty of Rome in which established among the "six" as 
they were then called the European Economic Community (ECC) came into effect in 
1967. The main practical elements of the Treaty of Rome were the customs union 
(the common market) and the Common Agricultural Policy.3 The only aspect of these 
early years of the Community that matters in this context is the extent to which the 
customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy did affect the monetary sphere. 
In the early 1960's was a period of low unemployment and relatively stable 
prices. In this environment there was little need for strong government intervention 
to stabilize the economy. The ratio of intra-EC trade to GDP stood only at six 
percent in 1960, but it went up to twelve percent in 1975; it is now at about fifteen 
percent. The functioning of the customs union was not really affected by these 
exchange rate changes, but the CAP required policy action if intra-EC exchange rates 
moved, because the prices of many agricultural products (especially cereal, but also 
diary products) are fixed in a common unit which was then called the European Unit 
of Account (EUA), but has since become the ECU. The EUA was defined as the 
3Apart from this episode exchange rates remained fixed until 
1969 among the six EC currencies. 
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gold content of one US dollar, the international monetary standard of the time. 
However, since the French and German Governments did not accept the price changes 
that would have followed from the exchange-rate changes (common Agricultural 
Policy) the only solution was to let the common agricultural market split up and 
maintain different prices (for agricultural products) in different countries. Thus, in 
order to maintain prices at different levels, a complicated system of Monetary 
Compensations Amount (MCA's) had to be introduced (Boyd, 1990). Finally, it 
should be kept in mind that up to 1968 the western world had experienced a full 
decade of relatively stable exchange rates. It was hoped that this situation would 
continue, and, one of the best ways of ensuring the continuation of this state of affairs 
would be to create an EMU. 
2.2 The Original Plans for an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
Four different plans for Economic and Monetary Union within the European 
Economic Community had been proposed during the period 1969-70 until the 
publication of the compromise (and second) Werner Plan in October 1970 (P. Coffey 
and J.R. Presley, 1971). 
The fore-mentioned compromise plan was the result of the fundamental 
conflict between the two schools of thought, the Economists and the Monetarists. The 
former school mainly represented the official Monetary views of West Germany and 
the Netherlands and the school's main architect was Herr Schriller. The Monetarists, 
the latter school represented the official monetary views of France and Belgium and 
the school's main architects were Messieurs Barre and Giscard O'Estaing. 
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Basically, the differences between these two schools of thought concerned their 
attitudes to economic coordination and development, the fixing of exchange rates, the 
provision of credits for countries facing balance of payments problems, the 
liberalization of capital movements and the question of supranationality. In sum, 
these attitudes to a large degree reflected the economic and monetary experiences of 
the second world war. Nevertheless, there was some degree of similarity in their 
attitudes towards budgetary harmonization and coordination within the EEC (ibid.). 
In very briefly discussing the Schilder Plan (economists), one notes that its 
overriding aim is the coordination of economic policies within the community. 
Unfortunately, it is possible to find any clear guide as to how such coordination is to 
be realistically achieved. Also, it is difficult to see how some countries could free 
capital movements without the provision of a well endowed monetary fund. 
In contrast, the second Barre plan (monetarists), which was to have such an 
influence on the old "snake" system and on the present EMS, was notable because 
categorically rejected the principle of fluctuating exchange rates and because it wished 
to give a unified international monetary personality to the European economic 
community. The main reasons given for the rejection of fluctuating exchange rates is 
that such fluctuations would hinder the desired convergence of the different national 
economies, would hinder the creation of a community capital market and would have 
negative social and psychological effects on the EEC. 
The next plan, the First Werner Report, which was examined by the 
community finance ministers in Venice in May 1970, was only concerned with the 
initial stage of integration, 1971-4. During the course of the examination by the 
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ministers, there seemed to be some consensus of opinion about the reduction of the 
marginal fluctuation around the parities of EEC national currencies, but a profound 
difference of opinion over the setting up of a reserve fund during the first stage of the 
EMU. Thus, the second and definitive Werner Plan was the compromise between the 
two schools of thought ("The Werner Report", Brussels, 1970). The Werner Report 
paid less attention to achieving convenient convergence and low inflation, because 
initial divergence in these respects among prospective participants was less visible 
than it is in the early 1990s. Although, the Werner Report was again unanimously 
endorsed by the council of ministers of economics and finance (ECOFIN) in March 
1971 was never implemented. Therefore, the reason for the failure of the Werner 
Plan, might have been the implicit reliance on the Bretton-Woods system which was 
collapsing at exactly the time the first stages of the Werner Plan were supposed to be 
implemented in 1973 (Basevi, Giorgio, Classen, Salin and Thygesen, 1975). 
Moreover, the exchange rate ability of the early 1960s had been achieved in an 
environment in which the stabilization of exchange rates did not imply that important 
domestic policy targets had to be sacrificed; inflation and unemployment were low so 
that neither fiscal nor monetary policy needed to be used aggressively to correct major 
disequilibrium (ibid.). 
2.3 The "Snake" System in Operation 
The real technical manifestation of the system was to be the "Snake in the tunnel." 
This "Snake" was to have been a narrow band of fluctuation (of 1.2 percent) 
originally planned for the central parities of the national currencies of the participating 
9 
member states of the EEC - which was to have moved in the cider band of fluctuation 
(1.5 percent) formally allowed for the US dollar. However, following the major 
dollar crisis of 1971, the suspension of dollar convertibility against gold and the 
subsequent, Smithsonian Agreement allowing a margin of fluctuation around the 
dollar of 4.5 percent, the EEC had to reexamine the situation. Therefore, in March 
1971, it was agreed to introduce, on an experimental basis, before July 1, 1972 a 
system whereby the margin of fluctuation around the currencies of the participation 
EEC member states would be 2.25 percent - this was to move in a dollar tunnel of 
4.5 percent. But, with the complete floating of the dollar in March 1973, the tunnel 
was dropped and the "snake" participants organized a joint float against the dollar 
(Gros and Thygesen, 1992). 
Although, the "snake" system did constitute a zone of Monetary stability in a 
sea of considerable international upheavals, it was not a particularly happy experience 
(See Table 1). Furthermore, the international economic and financial turmoil of the 
early and mid-1970s quickly brought the process of monetary unification to a halt. 
Recurrent realignments and the exit of several EEC members soon made it clear that 
the snake was not capable of coordinating Europe's Monetary policies. With their 
very different approaches to stabilizing the economy the EC countries experienced 
correspondingly different inflation rates and volatile exchange rates. A fresh impulse 
for closer monetary coordination had to come again from the political side. In a 
famous speech in Florence in 1977, European Commissions President Ray Jenkins 
criticized the concept of a gradual "politique des petits pas" to build the monetary 
union on the basis of economic union (Jenkins 1978). Jenkins advocated a big leap 
10 
forward instead. Monetary union would become the driving political force to obtain 
economic integration. 
This idea was taken up at the Bremen Summit in July 1978 by Chancellor 
Schmidt and President Giscard D'Estaing who embarked on a political "tour de force" 
for a new monetary arrangement, at the end of which the EC formed the EMS in 
December 1978 (Ludlow 1982). The EMS came into operation on March 13, 1979. 
11 
Table 1 	 Chronological History of the Snake 
1971 
Aug 	 15 
Dec 19 
Suspension of dollar convertablility to gold 
Smithonian Agreement: Return to fixed parities for IMF Currencies: band of 
4.5 percent allowed for the dollar 
1972 
Mar 	 21 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities proposing the "Snake" 
of the community Currencies (a band of fluctuation of 2.25 percent)in the 
dollar tunnell 	 (a band of 4.5 percent) 
April 	 10 Basel Agreement Between EEC banks to implement the Resolution of 21 March 
April 24 Implementation of Basel agreement. 	 Participating countries: Belgium, 	 France 
Germany (west), 	 Italy , Luxembourg, 	 and the Netherlands 
May 1 The United Kingdom, 	 Denmark, 	 Ireland, 	 join the "snake" Agreement 
May 23 The Norway becomes associated 
June 23 Britain and Ireland leave the "snake" 
June 27 Denmark withdraws 
October 10 Denmark rejoins the "snake" 
7 	 1973 
Feb 13 Italy leaves The "Snake" 
Mar 	 19 Transition to the joint float: 	 interventions to maintain fixed margins 
against the dollar 	 ("tunnel") 	 are discontinued 
Mar 19 Sweden becomes associated 
Mar 	 19 The Deutsche Mark is revalued by 3 percent 
Apr 3 Establishment of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund is approved 
Jun 24 The DM is revalued by 5.5 percent 
Sep 17 The Dutch Guilder is revalued by 5 percent against the EMUA 
Nov 16 The Norwegian Kroner is revalued by 5 percent 
1974 
Jan 	 19 France leaves The "Snake" 
1975 
Jul 	 10 France Returns 
1976 
Mar 15 France withdraws again 
Oct 	 17 Special realignment (the Frankfurt "one") of exchange rates against the 
EMUA. 	 The Danish Krone is devalued by 6 percent, 	 the Dutch Guilder and he 
Belgian Franc by 2 percent and the Norwegian Krone and Swedish Krona by 3 
percent 
1977 
Apr 	 1 Devaluations against the EMUA. 	 Swedish Krona: 	 6 percent and Danish and 
Norwegian Kroner: 	 3 percent 
Aug 28 Sweden withdraws; 	 the Danish and Norwegian Kroner are devalued by 5 percent 
1978 
Feb 13 The Norwegian Krone is devalued by 8 percent 
Oct 	 17 Revaluations against the EMUA. 	 DM: 	 4 percent; 	 Dutch Guilder and Belgian 
Franc by 2 percent. 
Dec 12 Norway leaves The "Snake" System 
1979 
Mar 	 13 The European Monetary System becomes operational 
CHAPTER 3 
EVOLUTION AND EXPERIENCE OF THE EMS 
The new system proposed by Schmidt and D'Estaing was designed to attain three key 
objectives: First, to stabilize exchange rates as far as possible with the aim of 
promoting the monetary stability as well as the economic convergence of the 
participating countries; second, to impose indirect political pressure on the economic 
policies of those countries which lacked monetary and/or fiscal discipline, and third, 
gradually to develop the ECU into a common European Currency, thus, "finally" 
giving the European Currency Unit (ECU) the same international economic standing 
as the Dollar and the Yen. Thus, with only small exceptions, The Werner Proposals 
are very much the precursor of Maastricht'. Since, the differences are so small it is 
of paramount importance to explain why it is that the new attempt to attain economic 
and monetary union should succeed where the plans of 24 years ago failed. 
The EMS has now been in existence for nearly 15 years. The most obvious 
changes in the EC during the 1970s and early 1980s were the three expansions which 
increased the community from six to twelve countries in three stages, United 
Kingdom, Denmark and the Irish Republic joining at the beginning of 1973, Greece 
in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. These accessions have considerably 
complicated the path of integration, not least because it has been necessary to get the 
4The Maastricht Treaty, The Skeleton for Economic and 
Monetary Union used and signed in February 1992 to replace the 




agreement of 12 parties rather than six. Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland had a 
standard of living considerably below that of the other member states, which extended 
the process of convergence. 
3.1 Institutional Elements and Policymaking 
The EMS consists of three main institutional elements: 1) a basket currency, the 
ECU, 2) The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and 3) credit provisions among the 
participation central banks. Of these three elements, ERM has emerged as the most 
visible and important element of the EMS. 
3.1.1 The ECU 
The ECU is a basket currency defined by fixed amount of each of the currencies of 
the member countries of the European Economic Community. The ECU is the 
common numerator of the ERM and is used as a means of payments among 
participating monetary authorities. For example, it is used for transactions related to 
central bank interventions in the EMS and the Credit facilities of the system. The 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) created an initial supply of ECU for 
intervention purposes against the deposit of 20 percent of the participating central 
banks gold and dollar reserves taking the form of three month revolving swap 
operations. With a fixed amount of each Currency in the basket, the relative weight of 
a currency in the ECU decreases as a consequence of a depreciation against the 
remaining currencies; the relative weight of an appreciating currency rises. This 
implies that the relative weights change significantly if individual currencies are 
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persistently weak or strong relative to the remaining ones, as has been the case in the 
history of EMS. In view of this tendency, the basket quantities of the ECU were 
adjusted in 1986, and 1989 to prevent the ECU from being dominated by the strong 
currencies in the system. Table 2 shows that the amounts of the two appreciating 
currencies in the basket, the DM and the Dutch guilder, were reduced, whereas the 
Italian lira, the French franc and the Greek drachma - three depreciating currencies 
acquire additional units in the basket. In September 1989 the Spanish peseta and the 
Portuguese escudo were admitted to the ECU Basket. 
3.1.2 The Exchange Rate Mechanism 
The cornerstone of the EMS is the agreement to limit bilateral exchange-rate 
fluctuations within margins of +/-2.25 percent around predetermined central parities5. 
Italy managed to obtain the wider margins of +/-6 percent for the lira in 1978; only 
on January 5, 1990 did the lira enter the narrow band. Spain joined the ERM on 
June 19, 1984, and the UK began participating October 8, 1990. Both the Spanish 
peseta and the British pound enjoy wider band of +/-6 percent. The Greek drachma 
and the Portuguese escudo remain outside the ERM. From its beginning, the ERM 
was not supposed to be a rigid system of fixed exchange rates. There was a common 
understanding that the central parities would be adjustable to changing economic 
conditions and the relative performance of the participating economies. Early 
proponents of the EMS stressed the point that the frequency of realignments should 
Shore precisely, the upper part of the band is 2.275 percent 
above the central parity, whereas the lower part of the band 
2.285 percent below the central parity. 
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Table 2 The European Currency Unit 
Currency Units  Relative Weights' 
Sept. 21 
1989 
Countries 	 March 3 	 Sept 7 
1979 	 1984 
Sept21 
1989 
March 3 	 Sept.9 
1979 	 1984 
Belgium/Luxemb. 
	
3.8 	 3.85 3.431 9.63 8.57 8.09 
Denmark 	 0217 	 0.219 0.1976 3.06 2.69 253 
France 	 1.15 	 1.31 1.332 19.83 19.06 19.3 
Germany 	 0.828 	 0.719 0.6242 32.98 32.02 30.33 
Italy 	 109 	 140 151.8 9.49 9.98 10.24 
Netherlands 	 0.286 	 0.256 0.2198 10.51 10.13 9.49 
Ireland 	 0.00759 	 0.00871 0.008552 1.15 1.2 1.12 
Spain 	 - 	 - 6.85 5.16 
Portugal 	 - 	 - 1.393 - _ 0.89 
UK 	 0.0885 	 0.0878 0.08784 13.34 14.98 11.89 
Greece 	 1.15 1.44 1.31 0.96 
Note: "Based on central parities 
Source:San Paolo, Ecu Newsletter,various issues 
Table 3 Exchange Rate Realignments Within the EMS (percent) 
Dates Deutsche Dutch French BeIg/Lux. Italian Dunish Irish 
Mark Guilder Franc Franc Lira Kroner Punt 
Sep. 24,1979 2.0 - - -2.9 - 
Nov. 30,1979 - 
-4.8 - 
Mar. 23,1981 
- - - - -6.0 - 
Oct 5,1981 5.5 5.5 -3.0 
- -3.0 - 
Feb. 22,1982 
- - - -8.5 - 
-3.0 - 
Jan 14,1982 4.25 4.25 -5.75 
- -2.75 - 
Mar. 21,1983 3.5 3.5 -2.5 1.5 -2.5 -25 -3.5 
Jul. 22,1985 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 -6.0 2.0 2.0 
Apr. 	 7,1986 3.0 3.0 -3.0 1.0 1.0 
Aug. 4,1986 - - - - - 
-8.0 
Jan. 12,1987 3.0 3.0 2.0 - - 
Jan. 5,1990 - - .. 
- 	 .7 
- 
Note: The numbers are percentage changes of a given currency's bilateral central rate against 
those currencies whose bilateral parities were not realigned. A positive number denotes an 
apreciation, and a negative number denotes a depreciation. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 
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not be regarded as a criterion of success or failure of the system (Commission of the 
EC 1979, 78; Van Ypersele 1974,9). Since 1979, there have been twelve 
realignments (See Table 3). In the roughly eight years from March 1979 to January 
1987, when the 11th realignment occurred, the lira experienced the largest parity 
depreciation vis-a-vis the DM (45 percent); the Dutch guilder had the smallest 
depreciation against the DM (4 percent). The smallest bilateral parity change (2.6 
percent) occurred between the Irish punt and the French franc. The evidence from 
the central parities shows that the EMS did not prevent sizable nominal exchange-rate 
changes over time. And this is consistent with the view that the monetary authorities 
did not regard the system as truly fixed exchange-rate arrangement but rather as one 
aiming at lower variability of nominal exchange rates (Van Ypersele 1979,6). For 
movements of currencies within the ERM bands see Figure 1. 
3.1.3 Intervention and Maintenance in the ERM 
Central Banks participating in the ERM are obliged to intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets if necessary to maintain exchange rates within their bands. If a 
currency approaches the upper or lower margins of its ERM band, then immediate 
action has to be taken (intervention at the margin). A weak currency central bank 
must sell foreign exchange in the exchange market to prevent its currency from 
depreciating further; conversely, a strong currency central bank must sell its own 
currency for foreign currency. To facilitate intervention the central banks can resort 
to the very short term facility (VSTF) of EMCF. Weak currency central banks can 
borrow, without limits, members' hard currencies under this arrangement, and 
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Figure 1 Movements of Currencies 
Within their Bands 
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members are obliged to grant such credits upon request. The EMFC Credit 
Provisions were changed in 1985 for the purpose of promoting the use of the ECU. 
Positive net ECU positions in the EMFC can now be used to obtain dollars or 
community currencies for a period of three months (versus 45 days in 1987) with the 
possibility of renewal, and ECU can be used to repay more than 50 percent of VSTF 
loans. The computation of interest rates on EMCF net positions is now based on 
money-market interest rates rather than discount rates. Both changes have made the 
ECU more attractive as a reserve asset of high liquidity (Micossi 1985,340). 
3.2 German Unification 
The most important development during this time, was the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the resulting unification of Germany. As a result, Germany, for 
years the anchor of the EMS, moved almost overnight from having very low inflation, 
tight fiscal policy, and a large current account surplus to considerably higher 
inflation, massive budget deficits, and a large current account deficit. In the financial 
markets, the immediate reaction to the collapse of communism was a sharp rise in 
long term interest rates in Germany and most other industrialized countries (see 
Figure 2). The most common explanation for this rise was the notion that the 
formerly communist countries, filled with obsolete machinery and equipment, offered 
tremendous investment opportunities and would soon begin to attract large inflows of 
capital from the west. This new source of demand for capital would raise real 
(adjusted for inflation) interest rates throughout the world (Alexander and Joseph, 
1990). 
Figure 2 Long Term Interest Rates % 
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We have basically reviewed the history leading to the creation of the EMS, its 
basic institutional structure, and its basic economic performance since 1979. Our 
synopsis illustrates that EMS was not only seen as a clear step towards Economic and 
Monetary Union through trying to achieve economic convergence and monetary 
control, but also a drive to unify Europe politically. The result is the Maastricht 
agreement which produced a new treaty, signed on February 7, 1992 to replace the 
existing community Treaties. It emphasized not just convergence to achieve EMU but 
cohesion, and progress on the fronts and a determination to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. EMU is a stage in the 
process, not the end of it, not just because of the potential for widening the 
Community but because of the intention of deepening it further. 
CHAPTER 4 
GOALS OF THE EMU AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
The Treaty sets out the nature, function, and constitution of the new central banking 
system which is to manage the single currency, monetary policy and foreign exchange 
in the new monetary union. It also explains how fiscal and budgetary policy are to be 
managed. 
4.1 Transitional Arrangements 
However, monetary union, as in The Werner and Delors proposals is intended to take 
place in three stages. The first stage which has largely been achieved, (with effect 
July 1, 1990) the freeing of capital movements within the twelve member states and 
the integration of financial markets under the single market program. That program 
in itself provides a major plank in the establishment of what is described as 
"economic union." 
Article 109e of The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the second stage for 
achieving economic and monetary union shall begin on January 1, 1994 (Handelsplatt, 
1992). This second phase began as scheduled with the creation of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI) which is phrased as the forerunner to a European Central 
Bank (ECB). The EMI is purely a transitional institution which will cease once it has 
been successful in bringing the community to the start of stage three and be replaced 
by the European Central Bank. Article 109f lists eleven different functions of the 
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EMI. In brief, the institute has roles of planning, monitoring and advising. In the 
transition, the member states' institutions have responsibility for the execution of 
monetary exchange rate and fiscal policy and the EMI is intended to promote closer 
cooperation between the national central banks. In addition, the EMI shall 
"strengthen the coordination of monetary policies" and "monitor the functioning of the 
European Monetary System." However, it is not until Stage Three that the ECB takes 
over responsibility for exchange rate and monetary policy. How exactly the ECB will 
function is to be established during the transition. What has been set out in the treaty 
is its objectives, constitution and the nature and composition of the board which will 
run it. 
The ECB together with the central banks of the member states form the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) from the beginning of Stage Three. For 
example, national legislation for their own central banks will have to be compatible 
with the statute of the ESCB. The period of transition will be concluded by 
December 31, 1996 at the earliest or by December 31, 1998 at the latest. 
However, the most important feature of the transition from the point of view 
of the present discussion is that for member states to participate in the monetary 
union, they have to meet four criteria of convergence.°  
First is the rates of inflation which is close to that of at most the three best 
performing member states in terms of price stability; Second, a sustainable 
6The exact def. of the 4 criteria is contained in two 
protocols appended to the treaty :The Protocol of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure" and "The Protocol on the Convergence Criteria" 
referred to in Article 109g of The Treaty Establishing the 
European Community. 
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government financial position, apparent from a government's budgetary position 
without a deficit that is excessive. The associated protocol defines this position in 
two respects: a maximum three percent for the ratio of the planned or actual 
government deficit to GDP at market prices; a maximum sixty percent for the ratio of 
government debt to GDP at market prices (deficit is net borrowing and debt). The 
government of the member states have an obligation under this protocol to ensure that 
their policies achieve these targets. Third, observance of the normal fluctuation 
margins provided for by the ERM of EMS for at least two years, without devaluing 
against any other member state currency (exchange rates stability). Fourth is the 
reflection of the durability of convergence in long term interest levels (ibid.). The 
associated protocol defines as a divergence not exceeding two percentage points from 
the nominal long-term government bond rates of at most the three best performing 
member states in terms of price stability (interest rates). 
However, in determining the readiness for Stage Three, the Commission and 
the EMI also have to take account of the development of the ECU, the results of the 
integration of markets, the situation and developments of the balances of payments on 
current account, and the development of unit labor costs and other price indices. It is 
important to stress here that once the majority states converge according to The 
Treaty and proceed to EMU through the new institutional arrangements of the ESCB, 
the ECB and the Economic and Financial Committee, accept an irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates which will lead to the introduction of the ECU as the single currency 
of Europe. Although, it is stated that should be a time table for this transition, the 
treaty does not say when the single currency should be introduced during Stage Three. 
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4.2 Economic Policy 
The term "economic policy" as used in The Maastricht Treaty also embraces fiscal 
policy. The key elements in the community's future economic policy can be 
summarized as follows: reports (analyses) on economic performance in the individual 
member state; there will be multilateral surveillance of economic developments and 
the consistency of policies with the Council's guidelines; The Council can make 
recommendations to the member state, which it may choose to make public. In 
particular, The Commission will monitor the member states' budgetary and debt 
positions on the basis of the planned or actual ratios of the deficit to GDP and debt to 
GDP using the same criteria as set out in the convergence criteria for entry into Stage 
Three. If the deficit is thought excessive after taking into account "relevant factors," 
including whether it exceeds government investment then the Council can recommend 
action by the member state to remedy it. If the member state does not respond 
adequately to the recommendations then the Council can impose four sanctions: the 
requirement to publish further information before issuing bonds or securities; inviting 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) to review its lending to the member state; 
requiring the member state to make a non-interest bearing deposit while the deficit 
remains excessive; or levying a fine. In order to these sanctions and even make the 
recommendation for action the Council has to act on two thirds majority of the votes 
cast - excluding the member state concerned - using the usual weighting system. It 
also contains the duty to appear before the European Parliament; the granting of 
financial assistance; the prohibition of public sector deficit financing on the part of 
ECB (article 104c, paragraph 11). 
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The political intention of The Treaty is to subordinate the community's 
economic and fiscal policies to the principle of subsidiary. In other words, the 
formulation and implementation of economic and fiscal policies will continue to be the 
prime responsibility of the individual member states. 
4.3 Monetary Policy 
Monetary Policy, unlike economic policy will not be governed by the subsidiarity 
principle. The assumption or belief here is that the national central banks of the 
member states will not be able to work together to create a European "stability 
community" (Article 105 of the treaty). 
4.3.1 The Form of the ESCB and the constitution of the ECB 
It is the ESCB, composed of the national central banks and the ECB, which has the 
objective of maintaining price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability, the ESCB shall also be obliged to support the general economic policies of 
the community. The ESCB has four basic tasks: 
1. To define and implement monetary policy of the community 
2. To conduct foreign exchange operations 
3. To hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the member states 
4. To promote the smooth operation of payment systems 
The ECB is the executive organization in the system. It will be independent, 
i.e. "shall not seek or take instructions from community institutions or bodies, from 
any government of a member state or from any other body." Furthermore, "the 
member states undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the 
members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB" (Article 107). The ECB will 
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have the exclusive right to authorize the issue of banknotes within the community. In 
addition, the ECB will perform certain auxiliary functions in connection with bank 
supervision. 
Table 4 shows the proposed structure of the ESCB and how the system will 
operate within the statutory framework established in The Maastricht Treaty. 
The practical impediments are clear to all. Thus, next we will discuss the 
problems and difficulties that stand in the way of achieving unification between the 
twelve EC countries. 
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Table 4 Proposed Structure of the ECB 
(a) The ECB Governing Council shall comprise the Governors of the national central 
banks and the members of the Executive Board of the ECB . The Executive Board 
shall consist of the President, the Vice-President and four other 
members (Article 11.1) who are appointed by the Heads of state/government after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB, the 
period of office being a single term of eight years. 
(B) Meetings of the the ECB Governing Council (in accordance with the Protocol on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB) 
CHAPTER 5 
PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE EMU 
The existing problems and difficulties that delay the process of unification between 
the twelve EC countries involves economic, monetary as well as political 
implications. It is very complex to compromise to the convergence criteria between 
the rather different perspectives brought to the subject of EMU by governments with 
different shades of political color and states with different economic interests. 
5.1 Economic and Monetary Aspect of the Problem 
The Stage One is entered when freedom of capital movements exists, Stage Two is 
begun with the coordination mechanism of EMI, but Stage Three is not commenced 
until the member states have "converged" in some sense (Maastricht, 1992). The 
intent for EMU are low inflation, low budget deficits, a stable exchange rate and a 
public debt limited to sixty percent of a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
No country, but Luxembourg at present meets all those criteria. Table 5 shows the 
relative divergence and convergence of the EC member states since 1985, on the basis 
of the key EMU criteria. Up to 1990 Germany fulfilled all four criteria. Since 1991 
the public sector borrowing requirement has exceeded the EMU benchmark of three 
percent. As a result of the latest price increases, Germany runs the risk of failing to 
meet the EMU stability criterion (Barrell,1992). France has fulfilled all four criteria 




Number of EMU convergence critiria fulfilled by the EMS member countries 
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 
Belgium 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
Germany 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 
hand 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
U.K. 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 
1 One criterion fulfield 	 2 Two criteria fulfilled 
3 Three criteria fulfilled 	 4 Criteria fulfilled 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Table 6 







Debt % of 
GDP 
Long term 
Interest rate % 
Germany 4.1 -3.4 45 6.6 
France 2.1 -5.9 39.2 7.0 
Italy 4.3 -10 108.0 10.1 
U.K. 1.6 -7.6 47.3 7.7 
Spain 4.7 -7.2 48.8 10.8 
Netherlands 22 -4.0 79.7 6.5 
Belgium 2.7 -7.4 131.9 7.3 
Denmark 1.3 -4.4 73.4 7.5 
Portugal 6.7 -8.9 63.5 8.7 
Greece 14.7 -15.4 106.7 23.9 
Irland 1.6 -3.0 91.6 8.2 
Luxembourg 3.5 -2.5 7.3 7.5 
Potential EU Members 
Sweeden 4.5 -13.0 53.0 8.8 
Austria 3.7 -4.5 56.6 6.8 
Norway 2.3 -3.4 43.3 72 
Finland 2.2 -10.8 37.0  8.9 
*Latest 12 Months 
Source: European Commission;(OECD); National Statistics 
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criteria since 1985. Leaving aside Greece and Portugal, even such major economies 
and long-standing European Community members as the UK, Italy, Belgium and 
Denmark consistently failed to fulfill all four criteria between 1985 and 1991. 
5.1.1 Nominal Indicators 
Participants in Monetary Union must have inflation and interest rates close to the 
average of the three best performers. The cornerstone of monetary union must be the 
fight against inflation. Inflation is the key indicator around which all the other 
aspects of monetary union revolve. For example, a country (Spain, Portugal, Greece) 
with high inflation rate is unlikely to have a low level of public debt or stable 
exchange rate. Interest rates will be accordingly high (See Table 6). Potential 
newcomers such as Norway and Austria do better on both counts than the EU 
average.' They could trigger monetary union before Spain and several others are 
ready to join, and stiffen the criteria for doing so. The EC is really targeting for an 
average inflation rate of three percent over the next twelve months. The rationale for 
having such criteria is to ensure that only countries whose microeconomic policies are 
compatible with monetary union and a low inflation future are able to join. So that, 
inflation is of great significance of a problem that most countries are experiencing. 
5.1.2 Fiscal Policy 
The prospect of monetary union in Europe has led to an increase in interest in the size 
and evolution of the government debt of the members of The European Community. 
7By next year, Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden could 
join the EU, crowding their central bankers into the cockpit. 
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The Treaty explicitly refers to the need to "avoid excessive public deficits," and sets 
the following thresholds which should not be exceeded: 
-Public deficits as a share of GDP should not be higher than three percent. 
-Gross public debt should be contained within sixty percent of GDP. 
Our discussion so far has shown that government solvency is a crucial issue 
for Europe. The high budget deficit and government debt carried by major countries 
(such as Italy and UK) block the road to EMU. These criteria reflect German 
concerns that if countries with large deficits or stocks of debt enter the monetary 
union, they would inevitably be tempted to favor inflationary policies for the union as 
a whole as a way of reducing the real burden of their debts (Whitt, 1993). If we look 
at Figures 3 and 4 we see that Belgium's gross public debt is 130 percent of national 
income, Italy's 108, more than twice the "ceiling" of 60 percent set in The Maastricht 
Treaty, where Germany's is only 45 percent. In terms of budget deficit the leading 
countries are Italy with 10 percent of GDP, Netherlands with 7.4 percent and UK 7.6 
percent (ignoring Greece and Portugal) as opposed to Germany with 3.4 percent (for 
Germany is considerably high due to German unification). 
5.1.3 Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis 
The Exchange rate stability in the EMU grows difficulties for some ERM members in 
maintaining competitiveness and differences in the cyclical positions 
of countries within Europe. A major crisis in the European currency markets in 
September 1992, followed by recurrent periods of turbulence, made the European 
Monetary System, viewed as the essential stepping stone to monetary union, look 
vulnerable. It was indeed called, by analysts, potentially incapable of surviving. 
Figure 3 Gross Public Debt as a 
Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 4 Budget Balance as a 
Percentage of GDP 
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A major explanation for this crisis that struck the EMS during 1992 and 1993 
is the economic shocks resulting from German unification (ibid.). Almost over night, 
Germany expanded its territory by about one-third and its population by one-quarter. 
But let's examine the impact of German unification on the other European countries 
within an IS-LM theoretical framework (see Figures 5 and 6). 
-IS schedule is based on the points of equilibrium in the commodities market. 
S (savings) = I (investment) + G (gov't spending) 
-LM schedule is based on the points of equilibrium in the financial market. 
L (demand for money) = M (money supply) 
The increase of budget deficit (from approximately zero in 1989 to 5 percent 
of West German GDP in 1992-see figure 4) leads to a rightward shift in the IS curve 
from IS to IS' in Figure 5. This raises the level of German output from Yg to Yg' 
and the level of German real interest rates from Ig to Ig'. The Bundensbank tightens 
German monetary policy to compensate, pushing output back down to Y2, the same 
level as Yo, while real interest rates rise even further from Ig' to Ig". 
The fiscal policy stimulus spills over into the rest of Europe, causing an 
upward shift of the IS curve from ISe to ISe'. Consequently, as the Bundensbank 
tightens its monetary policy, the rest of Europe is forced to do so as well in order to 
maintain exchange rate parities in the ERM (+/-2.25%), shifting the LM curve to the 
left from LMe to LMe'. The German fiscal/monetary policy mix results in a level of 
output unchanged from the original level, but there is an overall fall in output in the 
rest of Europe from Ye to Ye". In the Figures the rise in European rates is shown to 
be the same as the rise in German rates i.e. Ig"-Ig= le''-Ie. 
Figure 5 - Germany 
Figure 6 - Rest of Europe 
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However, as result of the uncertainty in financial markets during the exchange 
rate mechanism crisis, a risk premium had to be paid by the other European countries 
shown as le"'-Ie". This wider interest rate deferential between the rest of Europe 
with Germany, resulted in an even further contraction of output to Ye"'. Warwick 3. 
McKibbin (1990) has provided simulations showing that without a realignment other 
EMS members would have to tighten monetary policy considerably and endure an 
economic slowdown; the slowdown would be moderated considerably if the other 
EMS members allowed their currencies to depreciate versus the Deutsche mark. More 
recently, William H. Branson (1993) argued that the fiscal expansion put upward 
pressure on German interest rates, which in turn raise the equilibrium value of the 
Deutsche mark. For a time the lack of an EMS realignment held the Deutsche mark 
below its new equilibrium , but the shock was so large that eventually the EMS came 
apart. As a result, two countries, UK and Italy, unable to compete within the band, in 
September 1992, felt compelled to leave the system and no less than four 
realignments took place in less than five months . In November 1992 (peseta and 
escudo); January 1993, (punt) and May 1993 (peseta and escudo). This violated an 
earlier tradition in the EMS back in 1960s when realignments were equally large. 
Fluctuation margins were widened dramatically to +/-15 percent on August 1993. 
Since then, Italy and UK have not returned to ERM with wider band of fifteen 
percent and they are now nine members of ERM (excluding Greece which has never 
been a member). 
The move calmed the markets, but raised another problem which puts in doubt 
whether a tighter system can ever be restored. That leaves one stipulation of The 
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Maastricht Accord that national currencies must trade in very close range to one 
another for months before a single currency takes effect. In the meantime, the French 
and Belgian francs and the Dutch guilder have moved back into the old 2.25 percent 
narrow range with the German mark, but the system remains vulnerable. 
5.1.4 Real Indicators 
When analyzing and comparing to assess national economic performance, economists 
have certain basic indicators at their disposal; first, the per capita national product 
and the national unemployment rate; second, the productivity of the working 
population; third, the relative strengths of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors 
in the economy and fourth, the country's trading links with other nations around the 
world. In addition to those, the state's share of gross national product, how public 
spending is financed, the relative proportions of government spending that are 
channeled into consumption and capital investment, and wage bargaining mechanisms, 
etc. (Spencer, 1990). 
A key indicator of relative living standards is gross domestic product (GDP) 
per head of population. As Table 7 shows, significant disparities exist between the 
relative income positions of The European Community Member States. Apart from 
Luxembourg, Germany and Denmark have the highest per capita GDP within the 
community. Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece are at the bottom end of the income 
scale (the capita GDP of Portugal and Greece is only just over half the community 
average). Although significant progress has been made in the three decades since 
1960, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece have not come any closer to the average 
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Table 7 GDP per Head of Population at Current Market Prices and Purchasing 
Power Standards, EC, 1975-1992(community average=100) 
Country 1975 1986 1990 1991 1992 
Belgium 103.1 100.6 102.6 103 103.4 
Denmark 110.5 117 108.2 109 110.2 
Germany 109.9 114 112.8 114.2 113.6 
France 111.8 110.1 110.1 108.9 108.4 
Greece 57.3 55.9 52.6 52.5 52.1 
UK 105.9 105.4 105.1 102.1 102.1 
Ireland 62.7 63.4 69 68.9 68.9 
Italy 94.6 103.1 103.1 103.9 102.7 
Luxembourg 126.7 126.2 125.6 127.8 130 
Netherlands 115.5 106 103.1 103.9 102.7 
Portugal 52.2 52.5 55.7 56.3 56.3 
Spain 81.9 72.8 77.8 79 79 
Source:Commission of the European Communities, European Economy 
Annual Economic Report (199 1-1992), p.222. 
since 1975. Indeed, Spain and Greece have actually fallen further behind. These 
significant disparities in national income indicate that the various European 
Community countries find themselves at a very different stages in their economic 
development. The gap between Germany and the UK on the one hand, and The 
Netherlands and Italy on the other, amounts to a full ten percent. 
In a study entitled "Ein Markt, eine Wahrung", The EC Commission 
emphasizes that regional differences in income and unemployment exist within the EC 
than is the case in the US. This leads the commission to assume that The Community 
is less well-equipped to withstand economic upheavals than the US. 
"Europe has a problem as far as global competitiveness is concerned." says 
Henning Christophersen (Wall Street Journal, Sept. 30, 1994) , Economics 
Commissioner of the European Union. Western Europeans on average work fewer 
hours, earn more pay, take longer vacations, and enjoy far more social entitlement 
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and job protection than their chief competitors in North America and Asia. An 
average western German worker, the best paid in Europe, earned $24.87 an hour in 
wages and benefits in 1993, compared with between $16 and $17 an hour for the 
average American and Japanese and $4.93 an hour for a South Korean. It seems to 
be a lifestyle that few Europeans are willing to abandon (See Figure 7). 
Other factors that indicate tremendous discrepancies between the individual EC 
member states are export dependence as well as the national account surplus or 
deficit. If the exports are measured as a proportion of GNP, the Benelux states and 
Ireland are most clearly dependent on external trade (with exports accounting for 50% 
of GNP in each case). The corresponding figures for the major European Community 
economies of Germany, France and Italy are significantly lower (34%, 23%, and 
20% respectively, see Table 8). When these exports are broken down according to 
Table 8 Exports as a Proportion of GNP, EC 1975-92 (percentage share) 
Country 1975 1986 1990 1991 1992 
Belgium 55.8 70.7 74.2 74.4 75.1 
Denmark 30.1 32.0 34.9 35.8 37.3 
Germany 24.5 29.7 31.3 33.7 34.4 
France 19.1 21.2 22.9 22.7 23.2 
Greece 16.9 22.4 22.6 20.7 21.2 
U.K. 25.9 25.9 24.2 23.8 24.2 
Ireland 42.7 55.2 62.1 63.5 65.0 
Italy 20.5 20.3 20.8 20.3 20.3 
Luxembourg 92.5 101.1 98.4 97.8 97.9 
Netherlands 49.9 54.2 56.6 56.4 58.3 
Portugal 20.4 33.2 36.4 32.0 30.0 
Spain 13.2 19.9 17.2 17.1 17.3 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, European Economy 
Annual Economic Report (1991-1992), p.248. 
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Figure 7 The Wage Gap-Average Hourly 
Labor Costs in Manufacturing in $:1993 
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recipient countries and regions, there is a great inconsistency with regard to trade 
relations with EC and non-EC countries. Geography plays an important role here, as 
to the differing trading traditions of the EC member states. The Benelux countries, 
Ireland and Portugal are most strongly dependent on the European Community as a 
sales market (over 75% of total exports in each case). In contrast, only about half of 
the exports produced by Germany, Denmark and the UK remain within the EC, 
Germany maintains close trading links with Austria and Switzerland. Denmark's 
export trading is closely geared to the North European EFTA countries, while the UK 
still depends on its long established trading links with the USA (See Table 9). 
Table 9 Structure of EC Exports, by Region, I991 
(percentage of total exports) 
Country Exports Exports to USA Japan 
to EC non EC 
countries 
BeIg/luxemb. 75.1 24.9 4.3 1.3 
Denmark 52.1 47.9 5.2 3.3 
Germany 54.3 45.7 7.3 2.7 
France 62.7 37.3 6.1 1.9 
Greece 64.0 36.0 5.6 1.0 
UK 52.6 47.4 12.6 2.6 
Ireland 74.8 25.2 8.2 1.8 
Italy 58.2 41.8 7.6 2.3 
Netherlands 76.5 23.5 3.9 0.8 
Portugal 73.5 26.5 4.8 1.0 
Spain 64.9 35.1 5.5 0.9 
Source: Statistics of the Commission of the European Communities,p.257. 
A budget deficit is commonly associated with a current account deficit, and 
hence a decline in net financial assets (the difference between gross assets and 
liabilities) for the economy as a whole. If observed over a prolonged period, a 
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country's current account (whether positive or negative) and its relation to GDP 
provide a rough guide of international competitiveness. The picture in 1991-92 was 
more evenly balanced. Only six of the twelve countries had deficits. Five of these 
countries (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK) had recorded deficits in 
the period 1974-1983 and in the years thereafter. In the second half of the 1980s, 
Ireland turned its balance of payments deficit into a surplus, as did Denmark in 1990. 
Germany's balance of payments position has worsened noticeably (See Table 10). 
Table 10 Current Account Balances, EC, 1985-92 
(percentage of total GDP) 
Country 1985 1990 1991 1992 
Belgium 0.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 
Denmark -4.6 0.5 1.3 1.7 
Germany 2.4 3.2 0.8 0.3 
France 0.1 -0.6 - 0.6 - 0.4 
Greece -8.2 -6.2 - 	 5.1 - 3.4 
UK 0.5 -3.5 - 0.8 - 0.9 
Ireland -3.9 2.5 4.9 5.8 
Italy -0.9 -1.5 -1.8 - 9.0 
Luxembourg 43.8 33.8 25.9 27.7 
Netherlands 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 
Portugal 0.4 -2.5 - 	 1.0 - 	 1.0 
Spain 1.4 -3.7 - 3.5 - 3.3 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, European Economy 
Supplement A, No 5/6 (1992),p.14. 
Suffice it to say that a country's balance of payments determines employment 
opportunities, capital transactions, as well as improved prosperity derived from 
increased international division of labor. For this reason the countries entering into 
ECU will be well advised to pay strict attention to the structural trend in their 
external trade relations. 
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5.2 Political Implications of the Problem 
Two important political factors continue to overshadow the plans. The first is 
national pride. Can anyone seriously imagine that Germany will give up the "mark" 
or Great Britain will abandon Sterling? Nobody admits it, but everyone seems to 
know that it is true. What about the people? Are they willing to give up their 
nationalities? Adopting a single currency would effectively mean giving up monetary 
sovereignty and that is proving hard to stomach of some (Gumbel, Sept. 30, 1994 
Wall Street Journal). Furthermore, though most people in Western Europe like the 
idea of being Europeans, opinion polls show that they still tend to think of themselves 
first and foremost as British, French, Danish or Italian.8 They are wary of giving too 
much power to centralized institutions, because they do not trust them nor do they 
understand them very well and they are afraid of jeopardizing their national 
sovereignty. Just as there is not yet a United European soccer team, so governments 
are still reluctant to relinquish national control in political and economic matters. 
The second and most important political factor is the independence of central 
banks of the European member states. Governments in other countries like France, 
Italy, and Greece have a different banking system that allows the government to 
exercise influence over the creation of money and the level of interest rates. 
However, the Bundensbank was very clear that a major contribution to the success of 
the German economy was the independence of the central bank and its unequivocal 
focus on the control of inflation. Thus, the political pressure on certain European 
8The Danish people rejected The Maastricht Treaty by a very 
narrow majority (50.7%) on June 2, 1992, and the positive outcome 
of The Bennett Referendum by, again, a very narrow margin (51.1%) 
in favor on September 20, 1992. 
banks creates inflationary problems as well as high unemployment ( De Grauwe, 
1993). These are major convergence criteria and they must be met before the 
entrance to EMU. 
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CHAPTER 6 
BENEFITS AND COSTS 
The signing of The Maastricht Treaty opens up the road to EMU and the single 
currency before the end of this decade. The member states of The European 
Community have decided to follow this road for, broadly, three reasons. The first is 
political: there is a growing belief in Europe in a cultural unity with a focus on 
loyalty. The second is a matter of practical convenience and economic efficiency: 
the use of a dozen different kinds of money is a source of inefficiency and a handicap 
to business. The third concerns the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy: it is 
widely accepted that the countries of Europe stand a better chance of achieving price 
stability if they tackle the problem together. 
In order to assess the potential benefits and costs of economic and monetary 
union, we analyze the three above reasons into a set of eight key criteria. 
6A Efficiency and Growth 
With the introduction of a single currency all exchange rate related conversion costs 
disappear on intra-community transactions. 
These costs can be split into two parts. First, there are the direct transaction 
costs households and firms pay to the financial sector in the form of foreign exchange 
commissions and the difference between buying and selling rates. Second, there are 
the costs borne inside companies, arising for instance from the need to allocate 
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personnel and equipment to foreign exchange management (in house costs). A recent 
strand of research into economies (see Akerlof and Yelen, 1989), suggests that even 
small transaction or information costs can have significant economic effects. This 
research would imply that the economic losses from exchange rate transaction costs 
are much larger than the direct costs themselves. 
The savings in transaction costs are derived from three different sectors. The 
highest transaction costs arise from the financial circle such as exchanging cash, 
banknote exchanges, and other retail transactions (Eurocheques, credit cards, etc.). 
These costs were illustrated vividly by the admittedly theoretical worked out by 
Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs, (BEUC) in 1988. For example, 
assume that a traveller embarks from Brussels in a clockwise tour of all of the 
community capitals (except Luxembourg and Dublin) with forty thousand Belgian 
francs. If he exchanges his cash into local banknotes at each leg of the round trip his 
total accumulated loss is about forty-seven percent. Table 11 shows how much he 
would lose at each of his consecutive conversions. The largest losses (16 and 21%) 
occur when buying or selling weak currencies like the drachma or the escudo (See 
Table 11). The cost of banknote conversion in the community is likely to amount to 
2.5% of GDP. Using the latter percentage, total banknote transaction costs that will 
be eliminated by a single EC currency can be estimated to lie between ECU 1.3 and 
two billion. The exchange margin for traveller's checks is usually smaller than for 
cash, but there is a one percent commission charge. Eurocheques, which in many 
member states are free of charge (upon the payment of a fixed fee), when used 
domestically cost normally between two and three percent if written in a foreign 
Table 1 1 Currency Transaction Losses In a (hypethetical) Round Trip Through 10 Count ries 
Exchanged 
on March 1988 
Exchange rate 





In Ecu* Loss in % 
B(Begin) BFR 40,000 925.18 
UK UKL 1 = BFR64,95 UKL 615,86 891.3 -3.66 
F FF 9,8065 = UKL 1 FF 6039,43 863.55 -3.11 
E PTA 19.47 = FF 1 PTA 117,587,49 843.69 -2.3 
P ESC 1.18 = PTA1 ESC 138,753,49 820.35 -2.77 
I LIT 7.75 = ESC1 LIT 1,075,339,52 706.43 -13.89 
GA DR 10,575 = LIT 100 DR 113,717,15 686.97 -2.75 
D DM 0.98 = DR100 DM 1,114,43 539.42 -21.46 
DK DKR 378.4 = DM100 DKR 4217,45 534.42 -0.95 
NL HFL 27.75 = DKR100 HFL 1,170,34 504.71 -5.36 
B(End) BFR 18,14 = HFL1 BFR 21,300 492.66 -2.39 
Total -46.75 
Note:*Official Exchange rate published in the official Journal of the European Communities March 1988 
Source BEUC 1988 
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currency. In the case of international credit cards, foreign currency costs vary 
between 1.5 and 2.5 percent. The associated economies a single currency would 
allow are, therefore, likely to lie between ECU 150-200 billion (Emerson , et. al., 
1992). 
Another direct transaction cost arises from intra-EC trade which involves 
mostly the corporate sector. Given the relatively high minimum fee, bank transfers 
tend to be a relatively costly international payments instrument for small amounts. 
They are the standard means of international settlements between enterprises, with 
bank charges being a function of the amount and the currency. Bankers' replies to a 
questionnaire submitted by the commission services suggest that when the amount 
involved is equivalent to ECU ten thousand, foreign currency bought on the spot 
market costs around .5 percent. Foreign currency conversion of an amount equivalent 
to ECU 100,000 was reported to cost about .3 percent; nevertheless, foreign exchange 
charges very often still exceed one percent for payments in reputedly weak currencies 
that are hardly used in international transactions, like the drachma or escudo. Very 
large amounts, equivalent to ECU five million or more involve costs of the order of 
.05 and .1 percent, which is the size of the spread that can be observed in the 
interbank market for foreign exchange. 
Bank charges declining with the amount to be converted, an estimate of 
average exchange transaction costs for firms requires also information on the size 
distribution of foreign currency payments and receipts such data exist for a number of 
member states and show that in-and outflows with a value equivalent to ECU 100,000 
or more claim about fifty-five percent of the total value of the current account 
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transactions in foreign EC currency. In short, small open economies with small 
currencies like Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland and to a lesser extent, the 
Netherlands, or countries with as yet unsophisticated financial markets like Greece, 
Portugal and Spain will benefit relatively more from the elimination of transaction 
costs (1% of their GDP) than Germany and France whose currency belongs to the 
ERM and is a well accepted means of international settlements (.1%-.2% of national 
GDP, Baldwin 1989 and 1991). Apart from eliminating exchange transaction costs, a 
single currency could also make an important contribution to cutting the present 
expenses and delays associated cross border-bank payments (BEUC, 1988). In 
comparison to the situation in the US, where a coast-to-coast cheque costs a fixed 
money transfer fee of 20 to 50 US cents and takes two working days, these costs and 
delays are substantial to the Community. A recent study by BEUC, 1988 found that a 
bank transfer from one member state to another of ECU 100 in the beneficiary's 
money cost on average more than 12 percent - of which less than 25 percent was 
caused directly by currency conversion - and took generally five working days. So 
that, with an estimated number of 220 million cross-border bank transfers in the 
community per year and the difference in fixed processing fee between a domestic and 
an international settlement (net of exchange transaction costs) around ECU 6 the 
potential supplementary gain could be set at ECU 1.3 billion (ibid.). 
The second part of costs, as mentioned above, is the in-house costs. The 
existence of different currencies leads also to costs that are internal to the non-
financial corporate sector. These costs arise for a variety of reasons. First, multiple 
currencies render the treasury and accounting functions more complicated so that 
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firms need to devote more personnel to these tasks. They also raise the managerial 
complexity in transnational firms in that they complicate central management's task of 
control and evaluation. Second, multiple currencies fragment cash management and 
thereby lead to company cash being poorly remunerated or conversely, to interest 
costs on debit positions. Third, they lengthen the delay between debiting and 
crediting bank accounts. Fourth, firms may incur opportunity cost in their attempt to 
avoid rather than manage, exposure to foreign exchange risk. 
Table 12 summarizes the transaction costs savings that can be expected from a 
common currency. To these costs it is necessary to add the in-house costs, of the 
order of .1 percent of GDP, which the corporate sector faces. Moreover, a single 
currency is also a necessary condition for a reduction in cost and time of international 
bank and transfers which could yield another ECU 1.3 billion. The total quantifiable 
savings in terms of transaction costs are therefore around .3 to .4 percent of the GDP 
of the community or about ECU 13-19 billion per annum. This estimate can be 
confirmed by looking at the revenues banks obtain from intra-community foreign 
exchange operations. Surveys in several member countries show that about 5 percent 
of all revenues come from this source; given that the banking sector accounts for 
about 6 percent of GDP this implies a transaction cost saving of .3 percent of GDP. 
Monetary union obviously eliminates exchange rate movements and hence 
uncertainty about intra-EC exchange rates which should stimulate trade and 
investment. EMU would eliminate nominal exchange rate variability among 
community currencies. However, some variability in national price levels might 
remain. Comparisons with other monetary unions indicate that the level of real 
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Table 12 Cost Savings on Intra-EC Settlements by Single EC Currency 




I . Financial transactions with bank transfers 6.4 10.6 
Bank notes, Eurochecks, travellers checks,credit cards 1.8 2.5 
Total 8.2 13.1 
2.Corporate in house-costs 3.6 4.8 
3. Reduction of cross-border payments cost 1.3 1.3 
Total 13.1 19.2 
Source:OECD 
exchange rate (the nominal exchange rate adjusted for movements in the prices) 
variability existing at present inside the original narrow band ERM members is not far 
from what one could expect in EMU. However, aside from this group of countries, 
EMU should lead to a sharp reduction in real exchange rate variability (Poloz, 1990). 
The gains from the suppression of exchange variability in terms of increased 
trade and capital movements are difficult to measure because firms can in many cases 
insure against this risk using sophisticated foreign exchange market operations. 
However, business surveys provide strong evidence that despite this possibility which 
is in itself costly, foreign exchange risk is still considered a major obstacle to trade. 
The suppression of exchange variability will be more important for small firms and 
countries with less developed financial markets that do not have access to 
sophisticated hedging techniques (Artis and Taylor, 1988). The irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates might bring an additional benefit by leading to the complete 
equalization of interest rates. However, experience in the EMS has shown that even 
if exchange rates are "de facto" fixed for some time, interest rates do not converge 
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completely as long as the possibility of exchange rate changes remains' (Williamson 
1993). 
Therefore, once uncertainties about exchange rates have been dispelled and 
transaction costs eliminated, there will "undoubtedly be gains in efficiency" 
associated with the realization of The Single Market. If, furthermore, business and 
industry really believed in the imminent establishment of economic and monetary 
union, then the union would contribute in the not too distant future to a further 
strengthening of investment and growth. 
6.2 Price Stability 
It is generally agreed that the EuroFed which determines monetary policy in EMU 
should aim at price stability. This is generally accepted objective, and beneficial 
economically in its own right. 
The problem is attaining price stability at least cost, and then maintaining it. 
However, this is not an easy task. The community has the opportunity to build its 
monetary union on the basis of the reputation of monetary stability of its least 
inflationary member states. Inflation involves substantial costs that are difficult to 
measure. The nature of these costs differs between anticipated and unanticipated 
inflation. Standard macroeconomic theory suggests that anticipated inflation of ten 
percent leads to direct welfare losses that are of the same order of magnitude, about 
.3 percent of GDP, as the direct transaction costs savings through EMU. 
9A good example is provided by the Dutch Guilder/German Mark 
that since 1983 the Dutch Guilder has expost not depreciated 
against the DM and the exchange rate has never moved outside a 
corridor of about +/-0.5% from the average. 
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The macroeconomic experience of the industrialized world suggests that, on average, 
high inflation countries have a higher unemployment rate and a lower per capita 
income. In addition, high inflation is usually associated with highly variable inflation 
rates and therefore, also with unanticipated inflation. Since unanticipated inflation 
can affect output temporarily, this explains why countries with higher inflation have 
also on average more unstable growth rates (Emerson, et. al., 1992). With all these 
in effect, assuming that the issues of institutional central bank design are handled 
well, there will probably be some gain in terms of the stability of the real economy, 
such as lesser fluctuations in output and employment. 
6.3 Public Finance 
EMU will have strong implications for economic policy at large, including policies 
for product and factor markets. These policies will be regulatory and financial in 
character. 
In the reorganization of public finances, a new framework of incentives and 
constraints will condition national budgetary policies, for which the key words will be 
autonomy (to respond to a country's specific problems), discipline (to avoid excessive 
deficits) and coordination (to assure an appropriate overall policy-mix in the 
community). In other words, those are the logical requirements of a well-functioning 
economic and monetary union. The need for fiscal autonomy and flexibility arises 
from the loss of the monetary and exchange rate instrument for individual countries. 
Indeed, EMU will place new demands on fiscal policy at the national level for short 
term stabilization and medium-term adjustment purposes in the case of country- 
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specific disturbances. Fiscal discipline is a vital component of EMU. Since the 
present fiscal position of some member states cannot be considered as sustainable, 
this a serious matter of concern. An important issue is whether EMU could weaken 
the incentives towards fiscal discipline. Effects in opposite directions can be 
expected. On the one hand, participation in EMU is indeed disciplinary since it 
implies the acceptance of monetary discipline and therefore the renunciation of debt 
monetarization. Financial integration should also lead to a better market assessment 
of national fiscal positions, although the effectiveness of market discipline cannot be 
taken for granted. On the other hand, markets cannot be expected to behave as if 
solidarity across community member states were completely ruled out, since concerns 
for solidarity are integral to the philosophy of the community. On balance, there is 
no compelling evidence that EMU would have strong adverse effects on fiscal 
discipline, but there is a case for addressing the risk of failures of market discipline 
(Boverberg, Kremers and Masson, 1990). 
On the spending side, a timely move towards EMU substantially reduces the 
ex-post cost of public borrowing during the transition to price convergence since 
present interest rates carry inflation expectations and risk premiums. Some countries 
would also experience a more permanent decline in the cost of public borrowing. 
However, this gain should not be regarded as general (ibid.). 
6.4 Adjusting to Economic Shocks- Cost of EMU 
The main disadvantage or "principal cost of economic and monetary union" is seen in 
the fact that national governments can no longer use monetary and exchange-rate 
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policy as an instrument for regulating the domestic economy. However, this loss 
does not bring much worry for the following offsetting reasons. 
1) Exchange rate flexibility will still exist outside the EMS which leaves the 
possibility for the community to change its exchange rate with respect to the rest of 
the world. 
2) For the original members of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, nominal 
exchange rate realignments have already been largely abandoned within the EMS. 
The costs associated with this nominal fixity have been borne or adjusted to , 
although the benefits of EMU are still to be obtained. 
3) Moreover, the very existence of economic and monetary union will diminish the 
impact of economic downturns on individual countries and enable future downturns to 
be tackled more successfully. In other words, economic integration will make the 
occurrence of country specific shocks less likely since product differentiation tends to 
dominate product specialization. For example, if product market integration is 
characterized by inter-industry specialization, this implies that a common shock to a 
specific sector (e.g. general drop in demand for a certain product) will asymmetrically 
affect the country in which the industry concerned is located. On the other hand, if 
intra-industry specialization is taking place, the shock will be more symmetric, 
affecting all industries in different countries involved in the production of the product 
concerned. Within the community, product market integration tends to be of the 
intra-industry type, notably in the manufacturing sector (Greenaway and Milner, 
1986). A recent study by the commission of the EC (1990), finds that except for 
Portugal and Greece the share of intra-industry trade in intra-community trade varied 
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between fifty-seven percent and eighty-three percent in 1987. Since intra-industry 
integration is characterized by the occurrence of economies of scale and product 
differentiation, the removal of barriers obstructing the exploitation of these advantages 
will increase intra-industry integration (Jacquemin and Sapir, 1988). 
4) EMU removes the external constraint inside the community which means that the 
current account balance of each country will no longer have any bearing in economic 
policy. It will no longer be a limiting factor (ie. facilitating external financing of 
temporary external imbalances for individual countries). 
5) The disappearance of exogenous asymmetric intra-community exchange rate 
shocks, the absence of non-cooperative exchange rate policies and the disciplinary 
effect on wages and prices tend to offset the negative impact of asymmetric shocks 
(Begg,1990). 
The community would have been able to absorb the major economic shocks of 
the last two decades with less disturbance in terms of the rate of inflation and to some 
extent also, the level of real activity. For example, Figure 8' shows sure advantages 
in regard to better overall price stability. Compared to a floating exchange-rate 
regime, EMU improves greatly on the stability of inflation and real economic activity. 
In other words EMU will reduce the variability of output and notably inflation; 
compared to the EMS, variability also decreases, since asymmetric monetary policy is 
replaced by a common monetary policy which is concerned with macroeconomic 
stabilization of the Community as a whole. The decrease in output and inflation 
10The position of each of the four regimes (free float, EMS, 
asymmetric EMU, and EMU) corresponds to an intersection between a 
regime-dependent output-inflation trade-off curve and a shifting 
preference curve. Indices EC average, free float = 100. 
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Figure 8 Float vs Fixed Exchange Rates 
macroeconomic impact of EMU 
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variability may be experienced by all EMU members, but is also dependent on 
national economic policies and the behavior of economic agents, notably for output 
stabilization. This is a renewed relevance, given that the Gulf crisis of summer 1990 
once again subjects the community to a potentially damaging economic shock. 
6.5 The International System 
The primary economic aim of EMU is to strengthen the integration of the community 
and to improve its economic performance. However, due to the Community's weight 
EMU will also have far-reaching implications for the world economy. 
Before we discuss major effects of EMU on the world economy, it is useful to 
provide some data that show The Community is indeed large enough in economic 
terms to affect global economic relations. The two measures of economic size that are 
most often used are GDP and external trade. Table 13 presents some data about GDP 
and international trade for the three major world economies (the Community, the US 
and Japan). Moreover, further progress towards EMU (including the completion of 
the internal market) should lead to higher growth in the Community than in the 
United States over the next few years. 
This table suggests that the EC is large enough to affect the world economy. 
Both in terms of total GDP and in terms of foreign trade The Community is of the 
same size as the US. The Community is also a significant part of the global economy 
since its external trade accounts for nearly one sixth of world trade; it accounts for 
more than a third of the total GDP of the OECD (whose member countries represent 
all of the important market economies). 
59 
Table 13 The Community in the World Economy 
	 GDP ......... 
	 Trade* 	  
billion 
ecu 




% of World 
total 
EC 12 4,700 34.4 430.7 16.1 
US 4,300 31.5 386.9 14.5 
Japan 2,550 18.7 218.5 8.2 
Note: 
*Trade is measured by (imports + exports)/2, excluding intra-EC exports and imports for the 
Community. 
Trade: 1989 data; GDP: 1990 data 
Source: Annual economic report of the Commission 1990/91 and OECD 
In terms of financial indicators, The Community would appear to be much 
bigger than the United States, as shown by Figure 9. Member states hold about 200 
billion ECU in foreign exchange reserves which represents more than a third of the 
world total and is more than five times the amount held by the US and about four 
times the amount held by Japan." 
With the ECU as a Common European Currency, it would be a strong 
competitor for the US dollar in the international financial system and can therefore be 
expected to partially replace the US dollar in global financial investments. 
Expansion of the ECU as a vehicle currency will yield some small 
microeconomic efficiency gains for the EC economy by reducing transaction costs on 
the exchange market for trade with non-EC countries for up to 0.05% of Community 
GDP. Moreover, it will , due to the development of ECU invoicing (which might 
11Foreign exchange reserves fluctuate widely from year to 
year because of interventions in the foreign exchange markets and 
the valuation effects of exchange-rate changes. The data should 
therefore be taken only as an approximate indicator. 
Figure 9 The EC in World Finance 
Foreign Exchange Reserves(Billion Ecu) 
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increase by 10% of EC trade), reduce exchange rate risks, and also give to European 
banks enlarged opportunities to work in their own currency. The Central Banks of 
ECU would be able to reduce their present reserves of foreign exchange and thus 
amount savings perhaps to 200 billion US dollars that will be converted into ECUS. It 
would also be beneficial to partner countries, especially in Eastern Europe, who could 
choose to pay their currency to the ECU (Emerson, 1992). 
As the European Currency will become a vehicle for trade, an increase in the 
demand for ECU assets can also be expected in financial markets. This effect is 
likely to be a relatively small size (about 5% of total international markets) 
because international portfolios are already well diversified. This would increase the 
exposure of the European monetary policy to external shifts in preferences or in the 
amount of ECU borrowing by non-residents, but this exposure would remain more 
limited than it would be for Germany if the DM were to develop further as an 
international currency. Whether or not this would lead to a temporary appreciation of 
the ECU can not be assessed with certainty. However, the exchange rate policy of 
The Community should be ready to react to an exchange rate shock (Canzoneri, 
1985). 
EMU will strengthen the Community as an economic policy pole within the 
world economy because adoption of a common monetary policy under the leadership 
of EuroFed will enhance the Community's identity and weight in international policy 
cooperation. Monetary coordination at this level can be expected to become easier, 
provided the sharing of responsibilities for exchange rate policy between EuroFed and 
the Council ensures an efficient handling of this policy (Feldstein, 1988). 
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Generally, within the world financial system the use of the ECU would benefit 
the banks and businesses belonging to the EMS. By acting in concert The 
Community would be in a stronger position to assert its interests in international 
decision-making processes and forums. 
6.6 Transitional Costs and Benefits 
Where inflation rates and budget deficits need to be brought down in response to the 
demands of monetary union, costs will inevitably be incurred primarily in the form of 
unemployment and a fall in the national product, which in turn places additional 
strains on the budget. 
The Commission believes these costs would be confined to the transitional 
phase, and would be greatly reduced by a clear political commitment to full EMU in 
the not too distant future: If economic agents (public authorities, companies, trade 
unions, individuals) perceive these commitments to be credible, they will anticipate 
EMU in their economic strategies and behavior. The Commission is aware of the 
beginning of the unification process (as set out in The Delors Committee report), 
whereas some of the important benefits (elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and 
transaction costs) arise only after the final phase has begun with a single currency. It 
follows from this that the transitional period should be kept as short as possible. The 
main factor limiting the desirable speed for the transition might be the cost of too 
rapid or insufficient convergence (Giavazzi and Pagano,1988). 
Convergence towards low inflation would be made easier through a credible 
exchange rate commitment, as shown by the experience with the EMS. The extreme 
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form of an exchange rate commitment would be the adoption of the single currency. 
For some of the high inflation countries the cost of disinflation might therefore be 
substantially reduced and the transition period much shorter if they adhered to the 
single currency once the low inflation countries decide to take this step. 
6.7 Regional Impact 
Where impact is concerned, the final distribution of costs and gains associated with 
the process of adjustment cannot be predicted, i.e. it is impossible to determine in 
advance which areas will be the winners and which will be the losers. The purpose 
of this section is, therefore, merely to provide two indicators of the approximate 
strength of the main costs and benefits for each member country. 
The first indicator is simply the importance of intra-EC trade measured as a 
percentage of GDP. A high value of this indicator implies that the transaction cost 
savings as well as all the other indirect benefits of a common currency discussed 
previously are important.' Figure 10' shows that intra-EC trade accounts for more 
than 20 percent of GDP in four member countries: Belgium, Ireland, The 
Netherlands and Portugal. These countries are therefore the ones that would benefit 
most from the direct and indirect microeconomic benefits of a full monetary union. 
For all the remaining member countries, intra-EC trade is much less important, but it 
never falls below 10 percent of GDP. The second indicator is a statistical measure of 
12Furthermore, as argued previously, a high degree of 
openness also implies that use of the exchange rate distabilizes 
the domestic price level. 
13Source: European Commission. The R in Figure 10 has been 
taken from a regression of each country's economic structure over 
a weighted EC average (using ecu weights). 
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Figure 10-Costs and Benefits Based on 
Intra EC Trade and Differences 
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the difference between the economic structure (the distribution of value added over 
thirty different branches of the economy) of the country considered and the structure 
of the economy of The Community on average.' Differences in economic structure 
indicate the likelihood of country-specific shocks for which the exchange rate would 
be useful adjustment instrument. And this indicator, therefore, represents the 
importance of the main cost of a monetary union, namely the loss of the exchange 
rate as an adjustment instrument. Since it measures a cost, this indicator is reported 
as a negative value. The more a country's economic structure differs from that of the 
community the lower (the more negative) becomes this indicator. 
Table 14 shows, again not surprisingly, that the poorer member countries have 
different economic structure. Greece, Ireland and Portugal have the highest cost 
indicators. But two of these (Ireland and Portugal) the benefits indicators are also 
very high, so that the overall balance should still be positive. Greece stands out as 
the worst balance since it has the highest value for the costs indicator and only a 
moderate value for benefits. The results for the other countries are also interesting 
because they correspond almost exactly to the political attitudes towards EMU. 
Belgium and Holland, two very open economies with a structure very similar to that 
of the community, on average stand to gain most of EMU. The four large continental 
member countries (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) have little to lose from no 
longer being able to use the exchange rate because their structure is very close to The 
14The statistical measure used here is the adjusted 
correlation coefficient between the national values and the 
community averages of the shares of about 30 economic sectors in 
total value added. Table 14 reports the value of this 
coefficient minus one. 
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Table 14 Costs and Benefits by Member Country Based on Intra-EC 
Trade and Differences in Economic Structure 
Countries Benefits Costs Difference 
Belg/Luxemb. 44.5 
- 1.39 42.11 
Denmark 13.65 
- 6.47 7.18 
Germany 14.35 
- 1.81 12.54 
Greece 13.25 -14.1 - 0.76 
Spain 8.95 - 2.07 6.88 
France 12.95 
- 0.71 12.24 
Ireland 38.85 - 8.48 30.37 
Italy 9.7 - 	 2.02 7.68 
Netherlands 34.2 - 	 5.14 29.06 
Portugal 24.55 - 10.31 14.24 
UK 10.7 - 8.40 2.3 
Note: Benefits = Intra-EC trade as a percentage of GDP = (exports+imports)/2 
Costs= (R"-1) x 100 
Source: European Commission; The R has been taken from a regression of each Country's 
economic structure over a weighted EC average (using ecu weights). 
Community average. However, their gains are somewhat smaller than those of 
smaller countries, such as Belgium and Holland because their economies are less 
open. In the case of Spain the result is somewhat surprising because this country is 
often put into the same category as Portugal and Greece. The UK and Denmark are 
the countries next to Greece, for which the balance of costs and benefits is more 
uncertain since both countries do not trade very intensively, with the rest of The 
Community and their industrial structure differs more from The Community average. 
This last factor has perhaps been overlooked in discussions about EMU when it is 
often just assumed that all countries with a similar income per capita also have a 
similar economic structure. These economic factors are certainly not the sole or even 
the main determinants of the British hostility towards EMU, but they might explain 
why the economic benefits of EMU are less widely perceived in the United Kingdom 
(Gross and Thygesen, 1992). 
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Overall this brief analysis suggests that for most member countries the benefits 
should clearly outweigh the costs. On the basis of two simple indicators used here 
this does not appear to be the case for Greece, but it would surely benefit from 
another aspect of EMU, namely a high degree of price stability that has eluded 
Greece so far, but that can be expected from the policy of The European Central 
Bank. 
6.8 Convergence 
The difficulties that stand in the way of achieving convergence have not been 
sufficiently discussed (ibid.). Instead the report simply asserts that Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands could enter 
into monetary union today without any great difficulty. Three other countries (Spain, 
Italy and UK) have some adjustments to make, but these are surely feasible within a 
few years. The two remaining countries (Greece and Portugal) have larger 
adjustments to make, but these countries too could, with political will set their sights 
on participation in the full EMU, at the same date as the rest of The Community. 
CHAPTER 7 
RECOMMENDATIONS OR PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTION 
We discussed the operational and institutional aspects of EMU as agreed in The 
Maastricht Treaty in Chapter Four and we saw that countries with different tax 
regions, technical rates and standards are sensitive to different economic and regional 
downturns in Chapter Four. In Chapter Six we identify the economic strengths and 
weaknesses of each country which will enable us to offer our personal conjecture of 
how to better the monetary integration process as proceed over the coming years, 
leading hopefully to the introduction of a common currency for a large majority of 
member states well before the end of the decade. We will give recommendations in 
two different scopes 1) by looking at problems arising directly from individual 
member states on their trial to converge, and 2) The Community as a whole. 
7.1 National Central Bank Independence 
All participating governments should gradually commit themselves to reducing their 
influence on monetary policy: In other words, we suggest that participating 
governments give up their power over monetary policy before EMU is reached, and 
therefore, central banks earn their independence. This will enable them to establish 
price stability in such a way that they will be ready for unification at the time set for 
the final stage. Consequently, government states will be induced to adopt budgetary 
policies compatible with central bank independence on the way to EMU. 
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Furthermore, national central bankers would have much less incentive to manipulate 
the competitiveness of national industries or the real value of government debt by 
their policies during the final transition. 
7.2 Unemployment and Growth (Productivity) 
As we discussed before in Chapter Four, the complete absence of convergence criteria 
for real variables such as unemployment and growth, make the current Maastricht 
framework an insufficient basis on which to enter into the final stage of economic 
union. 
Thus, we propose that unemployment become the fifth major variable of 
convergence criteria of EMU which will integrate the health of an economy. 
The Center for International Prospective Studies and Information, maintained 
in a recent study that European economies would have to grow by a Herculean 5% 
average rate for the rest of the decade in order to reduce their average unemployment 
rate to 5% from more than 11 % currently. Clearly, there should be a realization in 
Europe for structural changes to begin shifting to something more flexible. That 
means deregulating rigid rules on unemployment, wages, and working schedules (Van 
der Ploeg, 1992). For example, countries with lower productivity, in order to 
maintain their competitiveness, are forced to offer other cost-related advantages such 
as lower wages, longer working hours, lower taxes, cheaper rents etc. Under the 
conditions of Monetary Union, any increase in labor costs in the weaker and less 
developed countries would have to be offset by a parallel rise in productivity. If not, 
these countries would continue down the path of growth stagnation and 
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destabilization. In the stronger countries, regions with below average productivity 
would continue to depend on internal transfers of funds (as has long be the case, for 
example, in the Federal Republic of Germany and USA, ibid.). 
Furthermore, we recommend that another factor that would enable European 
Community to create jobs and gradually restore full employment, the open market to 
privatization competition of various Business sectors, agreeing to abolish the 
monopolies. For example, more than 80% of the 35 million jobs created in the US 
since 1974 came from the private sector, according to a global jobs study by the 
OECD. By contrast, two thirds of the 10 million jobs created in Western Europe 
during the same period came courtesy of taxpayers (Wall Street Journal, October 30, 
1994). 
In Europe, private employers are wary of hiring new workers, with their high 
salaries and fat benefit packages, because they become practically tenured under 
European job-protection laws (ibid.). This effectively prevents them from copying the 
U.S. example of laying off workers when demand is weak and returning, when the 
economy picks up (See Figure 11). 
73 Margins of Fluctuation 
The widening of the fluctuation margins to +1-15 percent on August 2, 1993 was an 
appropriate and necessary solution (Hans Tietmeyer,Deutsche Bundensbank, 1994). 
The EMS is still alive and probably healthier than it was before August 1993. 
Despite this positive assessment, Europe could have avoided most of the turbulence in 
the past few years, if it had accepted the necessary realignments and the widening of 
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Figure 11 The US Has Created More 
Jobs Than Europe 
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margins earlier. This is clearly the predominant view among central bankers and 
finance minister, in Europe. It takes better account of diverging conditions in the 
countries concerned and extends their room for maneuver. 
We therefore suggest that the wide band remain and give the option to each 
monetary authority to adhere to old narrow bands of +1-2.25 percent as a police 
commitment. Surprisingly, for many observers, most of the EMS currencies quickly 
returned to the old margins after August l993.15 They did so, not because of any 
obligation on the part of central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange markets, 
but rather because of the governments' own efforts. Governments are free to signal 
their commitment to price stability and EMU by adhering to narrow bands, vis-a-vis 
the most stable currencies in the EMS. Inflation and interest rates are converging, 
even among countries whose currencies were forced out of the ERM. The 
Bundensbank is cutting interest rates and hard-core central banks are shadowing its 
moves. 
At the same time it has also curbed exchange rate speculation. There is no 
longer a one way bet. Furthermore, the system is not exposed to speculative attacks 
as exchange rates approach the limits of the narrow bands, because interventions as 
mentioned above are not obligatory, and consequently, speculators bear the risk of 
capital losses even at the margins of the narrow bands. The proposed voluntary 
nature of the narrow-band interventions means that hard-currency central banks in the 
system can not be forced to soften their monetary discipline to support weaker 
15The ERM's "hard-core" currencies including the French, 
Belgium and Luxembourg francs - have gone back to their earlier 
2.25% trading bands, though they are free to veer as much as 15% 
from their central parities. 
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currencies. This fosters the convergence of inflation rates at a low level. A formal 
return to old fluctuation margins combined with a respective obligation to intervene, 
is under present circumstances neither necessary nor an adequate condition for the 
EMU convergence process (ibid.) 
7.4 The Central Bank Governors 
It is widely evident in view of our study that most of the EC countries are coping 
with problems of high inflation, unemployment and necessary realignments in their 
effort to keep exchange rates within a designated band. 
As the scheduled date for entrance for full EMU approaches, we suggest that 
the council of EMS Central Bank Governors meet at least once a month to evaluate 
each member state's position - where they stand in terms of convergence and if they 
spot weak positions, discuss monetary policy and make policy recommendations. This 
builds experience and provides the information necessary for increasingly closer 
policy coordination and eventually, a common monetary policy. Until EMU has been 
achieved, authority over monetary policy rests entirely with the national institutions. 
If individual exchange rates move outside the band then the states should be 
encouraged to state the reasons for the realignment and thus enable The Council to 
reach and issue a formal decision to realign or to maintain the relevant central 
parities. Moreover, making realignment decisions regular and formal events would 
reduce the symbolic and political content of these decisions. This would destroy the 
current unfortunate perception in some EMS countries of a trade off between political 
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commitment to EMU and desirable exchange-rate flexibility16 (Neumann and Von 
Hagen, 1992). 
7.5 New Members in EC 
The EC should target expanding The European Market to raise annual growth rates. 
Current and most potential candidates like Austria, Sweden, Norway, and Finland 
should be encouraged and promoted to join EC as scheduled (January 1995) because 
their entry into EU will bring another 25.5 million consumers who will bring an 
added economic output roughly equivalent to Canada's domestic product (OECD, 
1993). As we have seen before in our analysis, their economic performance and their 
convergence towards union are even better than some countries already members of 
The Community. Still to come are the Eastern European countries, which are on track 
for entry within the next 10 years. But Table 15 shows that the number of votes in 
The Council of Ministers is an issue dividing big and small. Big countries have more 
votes in the decision-making Council of Ministers so they cannot be out-voted by a 
gaggle of small ones. On the other hand big countries may object to further 
expansion because they will have to wait for years before their turn for the presidency 
of The Council comes again.' 
16That such a change in political and symbolic value of 
monetary policy variable is possible without much difficulty is 
exemplified by the German discount rate. Up until the mid-
1970's, changes in the discount rate received much public 
attention because they were generally regarded as an indication 
of future policy intentions. Since then, this role has been 
taken by other Bundensbank instruments and discount rate changes 
go widely unnoticed in Germany. 
17At the moment the presidency of The Council - which 
carries the responsibility for organizing the EC's affairs - 
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Table 15 	 EC Arithmetic 










Sweden* 4 or 5 






Note:* Potential new-corners 
Source: European Commission 
7.6 Fiscal Policy 
Countries with high budget deficits and high public debts are in great need of 
corrective fiscal action. These countries are encouraged as they take austere fiscal 
measures in cutting consumer and business, taxes and government expenditures so that 
they reduce large deficits. Major reforms in Gongressional and Executive Branch 
budget procedures should be adopted promptly so that the total Government spending 
can be brought under effective control. Another consequence for The Community as 
a whole for the lack of fiscal discipline would be a general rise in interest rates and 
an external deficit for Europe vis-a-vis the rest of the world (Guglielmo, 1992). 
The creation of Monetary Union will inevitably affect the setting of fiscal 
policy. Even if monetary policy becomes the only responsibility of the new 
rotates from one country to another for a term of six months. 
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Community institutions, with fiscal policy remaining in the domain of national 
governments, the fact that they will no longer be able to monetize debt has 
implications for policy choices. Fiscal Policy may play a more important role as 
stabilization tool in EMU. In the standard Mundell-Flemming framework (Frankel 
and Razin, 1987), in which sticky prices are assumed fiscal policy is most effective 
when exchange rates are fixed and there are free Capital movements. Because in 
fixed rate system a fiscal expansion does not lead to a rise in interest rates and to an 
appreciation of the exchange rate, some countries might resort more frequently to 
fiscal measures to respond to shocks, especially if they are country-specific. 
7.7 Cohesion Fund 
We propose that EC countries agree to a cohesion fund which will be solely used to 
strengthen the ability of the poorer EC countries to reduce high fiscal budget deficits. 
This fund will be supported by stronger countries like Germany, France and The 
Netherlands where they also should create additional demand so that weaker 
economies such as Greece and Portugal would be able to increase their exports and 
thus cut domestic unemployment. The treatment of cohesion formed an integral part 
of the discussions at Maastricht and its role has been considerably enhanced in the 
ensuing treaty (NIESR, 1991). 
7.8 People 
People are a big factor in the successful process of EMU, and it should not be 
forgotten. Because they reserve the right to vote and consequently as a comprising 
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body of the country, are able to cause problems in the economy in their struggle to 
maintain monetary values (such as prices, wages, mortgages, receivables and 
liabilities) at satisfactory levels. Moreover, people are emotionally attached to their 
own currencies and a longer period of preparation may not suffice to win their hearts 
and minds. Therefore, governments need to take people more seriously by explaining 
The Maastricht Treaty and persuading them by portraying the expected benefits. This 
explains, for example, why The Treaty has had such a smooth ride in countries like 
Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy where their respective governments have been 
effective and persuasive in this manner (De Grauwe, 1993). 
7.9 Timetable 
According to The Maastricht Treaty, as mentioned in Chapter Four, members of the 
EC that meet the convergence criteria are committed to going ahead with monetary 
union no later than January 1, 1999. Nevertheless, an enormous amount of 
uncertainty continues regarding the timing of monetary union and about the identities 
of the participating countries. To shrink the lengthy period of uncertainty that invites 
turmoil in the foreign exchange markets, we propose that those countries that meet the 
convergence criteria move ahead earlier. The Treaty itself allows for an earlier 
union, but only if a majority of members are ready by the end of 1996. Because it 
appears that this condition is unlikely to be met, the treaty itself is an obstacle to 
earlier union. Moreover, the period of uncertainty might continue into the next 
century because of the possibility that none of the EC members will satisfy all The 
Treaty's criteria for union by the deadline of January 1, 1999. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE MEMBER STATES - OUTLOOK AND PROSPECTS 
Finally, we have reached Chapter Eight, where we are expected to give an outside 
view of what analysts and experts (economists) think about EMU, as well as our, and 
we will also give our opinion on the prospect of what countries are ready to step in 
the house of EMU at the designated timetable. We will conclude with a brief 
discussion of the reasons why the political, institutional and economic environment 
makes it likely that EMU will in our view be achieved by the end of this decade. 
8A Outlook 
Martin Feldstein (1992) - Professor of Economics at Harvard University argues that 
the European Community should abandon its plans for monetary union. The 
European Commission has summarized in the title of its publication, "One Market, 
One Money" that the adoption of a single currency is necessary to perfect the single 
market's free trade in goods and services. This is what Martin says: "The creation 
of a single market for goods and services does not require a monetary union. It is 
possible to have all the benefits of free trade without a common currency. Indeed, 
the shift to a common currency could actually diminish trade within Europe. It is 
also likely to reduce economic well-being by raising future unemployment and 
increasing the cyclical volatility of activity within individual countries. And it could 
cause a higher rate of inflation than the current monetary arrangements." He uses as 
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an example the recent US establishment of a Free-Trade Agreement with Canada and 
Mexico. Nobody seriously suggests that The United States, Canada and Mexico 
should form a currency union. Martin continues that this difference does not reflect 
the economic requirements for efficient free-trade zones in Europe or North America. 
Instead, it reflects different political goals. EMU is sought by those who want to 
move to a political union among the current members of The European Community. 
They seek a common currency both as public symbol of super-nationhood and as an 
effective way to shift decisions on monetary and eventually fiscal policy from national 
capitals to Brussels. 
Mr. Max Kohnstamm (1994), a part time consultant at EU headquarters in 
Brussels (Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1994) says, "I'm more optimistic than I was 
one year ago because the debate about European integration has come out into the 
open. For much of the last year, Europe has been like a sailing ship with no wind. 
Nothing is worse than that. Once there is a wind, you may go in the wrong 
direction, but at least you are going somewhere." Government leaders are already 
preparing for a conference in 1996 that is supposed to take key decisions on the EU's 
future shape and direction. Mr. Kohnstamm says major changes are vital, and 
overdue, if the union is to function efficiently and counter the sense of alienation 
many people feel about it. He continues with European integration as being in his 
view an overriding political issue in which economic matters are used because they 
are necessary in themselves, but are at the same time means to an end. 
The signs are not very auspicious. Maastricht allowed Britain and Denmark to 
"opt out" of an eventual single European currency, which Mr. Kohnstamm says is the 
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most coherent part of the treaty, "I am deeply opposed to Europe a-la-carte. "'8 He 
says, "It destroys the essence of a community structure." At the same time, he can't 
resist smiling at the way European nations have already moved so close to one 
another, despite all the difficulties. 
David de Pury (November 5, 1992), Co-chairman of the Swedish-Swiss 
Heavy-Industrial Aden Brown Boveri Group, thinks that Europe is making 
tremendous in becoming a single market, if you look at the new rules of the European 
economic area (combining the twelve members of the EC and the five members of the 
European Free Trade Area). De Pury says, "But Europe is obviously not a one speed 
market. You have the Deutschemark zone and there are countries which are outside 
this zone." He concludes that there is no doubt in his mind that towards the end of 
this decade Europe would have become one of the most dynamic markets in the 
world. "But I would be cautious today for the future because I see growing political 
turmoil in Eastern Europe and monetary turmoil in the EC." Another businessman 
named Bridgen(1992) chief Executive of Asea Group, believes that there is a 
compelling inevitability that there will be a monetary union and that the clear leader 
of Europe is Germany. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) estimated a model with two variables, output 
growth and inflation. They assumed that movements in these two variables are 
induced by shocks to aggregate demand, caused, for example, by changes in monetary 
policy or shocks to aggregate supply such as changes in production technology. A 
18The opt-outs from Maastricht won by Britain and by Denmark 
suggest that as the EC prepares to admit newcomers to its table, 
it offer them less of a set menu and more a-la-carte. 
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positive demand shock caused by an increase in the money supply would be expected 
to raise both output and inflation, though in the long run economic theory suggests 
that the effect in output would eventually fade away to zero. A positive supply shock 
caused by the development of computers that make factories more efficient would be 
expected to raise output but lower inflation. In recent years, sudden rises in the price 
of oil caused by OPEC decisions to limit oil exports have often been cited as negative 
supply shocks to industrialized countries that rely heavily on imported oil. 
So that, using their model, Bayoumi and Eichengreen estimated the historical 
time series of aggregate demand and supply shocks in each country. Taking Germany 
as an anchor country, they found substantial positive correlations between demand and 
supply shocks in core countries and similar shocks in Germany. They concluded that 
monetary union makes much more sense for these core countries than for the entire 
EC, as envisaged by The Maastricht Treaty. Using similar techniques, but different 
data, Joseph A. Whitt, Jr. (1993) concluded that even the core European Countries 
may not be good candidates for monetary union with Germany because asymmetric 
demand shocks appear to be common. A senior Clinton administration (Wall Street 
Journal, Sep. 30, I994) official sums up one outsiders view like this, "As a rule, big 
institutions are hard to change. Europe's problem is that it knows it cannot afford the 
system but still can't bring itself to abandon it." On the other hand, Mr. Giscard 
D'Estaing, (ibid., 1994) says, "The year 1996 will be the moment of truth for 
Europe. Either we succeed and continue the process of integration or we fail to 
reform." In that case he adds, "governments and the public will have to ask 
themselves some very tough questions regard to what Europe is really all about." 
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Although many economists see European unity still as unfinished business and 
as an unfeasible event, in our view, it is indeed not true. Europe has a strong 
potential of becoming a powerful market in the world that will begin to overtake its 
major competitors, Japan and The United States, by the end of the century. 
All member countries have taken the matter seriously and they are working 
intensively and closely to overcome economic turmoil and to meet the stability 
requirements. They have seen a light at the end of the tunnel, because the benefits 
outweigh the costs (as we examined in Chapter Six) in moving to full EMU. I believe 
that entrance into EMU has taken place as a personal goal to each individual country, 
since they have all shown willingness to move to a more developed political union. 
Here is why we think positively. 
8.2 Prospects 
Europe is growing again. With Germany's economy rebounding - almost a half year 
ahead of schedule - The European Commission now expects European Union 
economies to expand about 1.6% this year after a 0.3% contraction last year. That 
compares with previously forecasted growth of 1.3% for 1996, which many 
economists last year considered hopelessly optimistic. The rebound is expected to 
accelerate to near 2.5% growth or more in 1995, according to the latest commission 
forecasts. Inflation remains low and is expected to run only 2% to 3% in Europe this 
year (see Table 16). Corporate profits are bouncing back from two years of steep 
declines as orders pick up and companies rigorously reduce costs. 
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Table 16 Europe's Recovery 
1992 1993 1994 
Imports 4.2% - 3.8% 2.5% 
Inflation 4.6 3.7 3.0 
Industrial Product - 	 1.2 
- 3.3 1.6 
GDP 1.1 -0.5 1.3 




The motor behind Germany's recovery has been a revival of exports. By May, 
economists were busily upgrading their 1994 forecasts from less than 1% growth in 
Western Germany to something closer to 1.5%. Deutsche Bank Research last month 
lifted its forecast for all of Germany to show 2% growth for the year, reflecting 1.5% 
expansion in Western Germany and 8% growth in the country's restructuring eastern 
half (Commission of European Communities 1994). Demand remains weak, however 
as companies favor downsizing over new expansion, unemployment remains high and 
continued cost cutting reduces disposable income. The best domestic news is that 
Germany's annual inflation rate could shrink to below 3% by year end, compared 
with an average 4% in 1993. One reason for the popularity of EMU throughout 
Europe is the ambition of other member states to copy the institutions of Germany 
and hence, to share its price stability and also its prosperity (Barell, 1992). 
Obviously, EMU as now intended is impossible without German participation, 
and although unemployment is expected to remain near four million at the end of 
1994, that participation seems assured. Figure 12 shows the country's percentage 
change in real GDP, as 1994 and 1995 projected. 
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Figure 12- Germany-Perc. Change in 
in Real GDP: 1994 and 1995 projected 
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8.4 France 
The French economy is showing a mild revival in both exports and domestic demand, 
helped by government stimulus for the automotive and housing markets. Most growth 
projections for this year have been revised up to between 1.3% and 1.7% from 
previous forecasts of about 1%. Although France has been able to hold annual 
inflation at just under 2%, it continues to pay a high price for its strong franc policy 
of holding the franc and French interest rates in tight alignment with their German 
counterparts. But the wish of the French government naturally, enough, is to 
participate in the decisions which shape the monetary policy of Europe, not just to 
follow the German lead ( Bordes and Girardin, 1992). 
The French rebound that began in the third quarter of 1993 was largely fueled 
by a rise in consumer spending. This increase, came despite a jobless rate of nearly 
12% that government reform efforts have been unable to correct in the face of 
popular opposition (See Figure 13). 
"Unemployment is still going up, but people have the feeling that the big 
layoff phase is over." says Francois-Xavier Chouchat, an economist with Banque 
Indonsnez in Paris (Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1994). "Now the key for domestic 
demand will be whether we will see a rise in capital spending by industry." The 
government favors moving rapidly to EMU, for both political and economic reasons. 
On our view it is unlikely that EMU will ever take place at all unless France is able 
to participate. Its participation by determined dates seems to be assured. 
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Figure 13 France: % Change in Real 
GDP: 1994 and 1995 Projected 
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8.5 Italy and United Kingdom 
Britain and Italy are of nearly equal population and yet they provide one of the 
starkest contrasts. Britain has followed a textbook free market model. It sold 
nationalized companies to the private sector, slashed government jobs and phased out 
loss-producing industries particularly in the coal and steel sectors (annual report, 
IMF, 1993). Lower interest rates have revived property markets and consumer 
demand, helping to boost projected economic growth of up to 2.5% this year. A 
competitive currency and the US recovery helped lift exports by 3% in 1993 and are 
seen gaining pace this year (see Figure 14). Unemployment remains high at nearly 
10%, but the chances for a broader recovery could begin providing new jobs in the 
months ahead. 
Italy, on the other hand, remains top heavy with state-supported industries. 
Plagued by political scandals, it has yet to take some of the difficult economic steps 
that Britain did. A recent industry survey showed a surprise 1.7% increase in 
industrial production during 1993-1996 mid-period. Of all western economies, Italy's 
still depends most heavily on state-owned entities that dominate whole sectors, 
including energy, banking, steel, insurance, chemicals and telecommunications. 
The reason we chose to examine these countries together is that, it seems that 
neither country can be characterized as better off than the other. Each has continuing 
and quite different home grown problems to solve. "You can argue for both countries 
being poised for growth." says Jane Schofield (Wall Street Journal Sep.30,1994) a 
London base consultant who works for several Italian companies. Thus, we are not 
expecting these two large communities in the EC to converge by the first period 
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Figure 14 UK & IT: % Change in Real 
GDP: 1994 and 1995 Projected 
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deadline (1996), but we do believe that they have a great potential for participation by 
the end of 1998. 
8.6 Spain 
Total national income per head of population in Spain is about two thirds that of Italy 
or the UK. Helped by a sharply devalued currency, Spanish exports surged 10% in 
the first quarter of this year, from the previous quarter. But some economists warn 
that Spain may have to wait longer for a homemade recovery. Despite the 
government's efforts to liberalize labor markets by making working times more 
flexible and easing firing procedures, the country's 24% jobless rate 
is expected to come down only gradually, limiting consumer spending. Growth 
projections for Spain vary broadly, ranging between 0.5% to 1.5% for 1994, 
compared with 1% contraction in 1993 (See Figure 15). Thus, Spain is classified in 
the same category as Italy and UK where it ought to be possible to accomplish 
convergence, but is also unlikely. 
8.7 Belgium and Luxembourg 
Luxembourg, the smallest country in the EC faces no problem at this time in meeting 
the convergence criteria and thus entering the EMU. Luxembourg is the only country 
that has consistently fulfilled all four criteria since 1985 (see also table 5). 
The average rate of inflation in Belgium over the past twenty years is just 
under 6%. The gross public debt is nearly 130 percent of national income, more than 
twice the ceiling of 60% laid down in The Maastricht Treaty. The budget deficit is 
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Figure 15 Spain: % Change in Real 
GDP: 1994 and 1995 Projected 
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around 6% of national income. The position on the stock of debt (but not on the rate 
of borrowing) appears to be considerably more serious in Belgium than in The 
Netherlands but the debt-to-income ratio is not actually rising in Belgium anymore. 
Projections by The European Commission suggest that it will remain virtually 
constant for the next couple of years. It is, of course, impossible at that rate for 
Belgium to meet the convergence criteria at first date in 1996 (Gross and Thygesen, 
1992). The problem for the Belgians is that interest payments on the debt are 
accounting for about a quarter of government revenue. Clearly, that situation would 
be eased if interest rates in Europe generally were to fall, but this remains at best a 
remote prospect. The Belgians will therefore, have higher taxation or lower public 
spending of other kinds than their neighbors elsewhere in Europe for the foreseeable 
future. But at the second determined date where there is no need for the majority to 
go ahead for the EMU, it is highly unlikely that Belgium will not participate (ibid). 
8.8 The Netherlands 
In many respects The Netherlands is already in a monetary union with Germany. 
This relatively small open economy, with output per person employed high by 
international standards, but output per head of the population rather lower than in 
France or Germany due to unusually low participation rate. Trading links with 
Germany are of the first importance (OECD, 1991). 
The rate of unemployment is rather higher than in Germany. It would be 
difficult now to see this as the cost of reducing inflation, since inflation has been low 
and fairly constant for the best part of the decade. The only problem which could not 
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be a real one is that the ratio of debt to National Income and the scale of public 
borrowing may both be "excessive" (79.7, -6.0 respectively) according to The 
Maastricht Treaty protocol. The Netherlands' close relationship with Germany forms 
no doubts about its capability of moving to EMU at the time specified. If EMU takes 
place at all it is very hard to imagine it taking place without the Dutch. 
8.9 Denmark 
The Danish economy is also small, but prosperous, with output per head of the 
population similar to that in Germany. The agricultural sector is rather larger than in 
Germany, but still employs under 6 percent of the labor force. There are well-
established links with Germany and The United Kingdom. 
The inflation in Denmark since the change of government in 1982, has been 
reduced by 1990 down to 2% from an averaged 8.2% over the past twenty years. 
Unemployment in Denmark followed the common European pattern of a steeply rising 
from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's, when it reached about 10%. Statistical 
studies suggest that this rise in unemployment played an important part in slowing 
down inflation. The most persistent problem of the Danish economy has been the 
deficit on the current account of the balance of payments, which persisted for an 
unbroken run of 26 years until 1990. It can be attributed to unusually low savings 
rather than unusually high investment. However, the tightening of fiscal policy in the 
early 1980's was accompanied by a period of quite rapid growth. 
Moreover, if the Danish economy maintains its recent performance it should 
have little difficulty if not at all, in passing the entrance examination for EMU. 
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8.10 Ireland 
In a small open economy like Ireland, the rate of inflation is very dependent on the 
exchange rate and on world prices. The rate of inflation has been low since the mid-
1980's, and recently has become one of the lowest in Europe (1.6%), and the central 
rate of the Irish pound in the EMS has been changed on only three occasions in the 
last decade. 
In short, the recent performance of the Irish is impressive, but it has 
underlying problems such as the ratio of public debt to national income which is high 
(91.6%). Because of the higher level of interest payments which that implies the 
level of government borrowing is also above The Community average. The very high 
level of unemployment (about 16 percent) makes Ireland a difficult model to 
recommend for the first date. But we believe that if Ireland improves competitiveness 
for the next few years, it will be able join the others without any great difficulty by 
1998. 
8.11 Greece and Portugal 
Output per head of the population in Greece is broadly the same as in Portugal (if 
calculated using indices of purchasing power), but lower in any other member state if 
calculated at current exchange rates. The agricultural sector accounts for more than a 
quarter of total employment - the highest of any member state. Over the past 20 
years, the rate of inflation in Greece has averaged 16 percent. In 1990, it was just 
over 20 percent, much higher than in any other member in The Community. Despite 
this high rate of inflation, Greece was not spared from the general rise in 
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unemployment, although the level stayed below the European average. The drachma 
does not participate in the ERM of EMS at this time and continues to depreciate 
rapidly each year against the ECU. 
Portugal's living standards are similar to those of Greece. About 20 percent 
of the work force is employed in agriculture. Unemployment in Portugal is very low 
compared with Spain and well below The Community average. The economy is 
showing signs of overheating and it is doubtful that such a good unemployment record 
could be maintained at the same time as the rate of inflation is being brought down. 
However, Portugal is one step ahead of Greece because it has already join the ERM 
of the EMS. Both countries face serious problems with convergence criteria and it is 
highly unlikely that they will go ahead with the others. They are aware of this fact, 
and they are taking serious measures to converge their economies within a reasonable 
timetable. But, in our view, if Greece and Portugal continue with the same economic 
tightening and determination, they will be ready to join at the end of the century after 
the creation of the single market along with whatever other countries qualify by then. 
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
We have finally reached the point in our thesis where we must justify our statement. 
Throughout the paper we have seen that the right time for transition to the monetary 
union depends on the rate of progress in Europe in meeting the stability requirements 
and on the willingness to move to a more developed political union. The political 
factors are admittedly beyond the scope of our target in this paper. For this reason 
they have not been developed. It is apparent that The Community is much more 
integrated in political terms. As we have seen discussed previously, The Maastricht 
Treaty offers two alternative deadlines: 1997 or 1999. If these deadlines clash with 
economic realities, the monetary union cannot be established until later. No one 
knows at present how many countries will be capable of fulfilling all the criteria by 
the review dates. 
Our research illustrates that the chances of the majority of the EU countries 
qualifying by the end of 1996, as stipulated in The Treaty, are not very great at the 
moment. But as we saw in our analysis the balance of costs and benefits in economic 
terms has also moved decisively in favor of EMU. Taken with the new political 
environment in Europe, there is every reason to believe that economic and monetary 
union will be attained, as the prospects for the second deadline look naturally better 
and brighter. 
Once Maastricht is ratified, as we have proposed, we believe that those 
95 
96 
countries - Germany, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Denmark, and possibly 
Belgium and Ireland will speed up moves towards monetary union on their own at the 
second deadline which is January 1999. Spain, Italy, and UK will join later as they 
feel ready - Greece and Portugal possibly even later. 
In our view, monetary stability fosters both national and international business 
activity. Nowadays, the financial markets are closely interlinked. When one of the 
bigger nations sneezes (such as the US), then everybody else is likely to catch cold. 
For example, if investors in any country fear fresh inflation, turbulence in the markets 
there can quickly spread to other nations. This is why they should all have an interest 
in currencies being as stable as possible. 
To conclude, as the EC is moving forcefully to adopt a single currency and a 
central bank modelled on the US Federal Reserve Board, if all goes according to 
plan, Europe in ten years could be the home not only of the world's largest financial 
market but also of a EuroFed and supercurrency rivaling The Federal Reserve and 
dollar in global influence. 
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